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FERTILITY DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN LESS DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPED REGIONS: COMPONENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Simon Kuznets 
l. Introduction 
The crude birth rates in the economically less developed countries 
have been over twice those in the developed countries in the recent 
decades. Such differentials imply differences in age patterns of birth 
rates through the life cycles of mothers and fathers; differences in 
age at time of maITiage, and between husbands and wives in later life; 
differences in birth parities; and differences in the size of households, 
in so far as they reflect the number of children in them. In turn, all 
these demographic differences have economic and social connotations, and 
these provide an indispensable framework for interpreting the persistence 
of the high birth rates in the less developed regions. 
The paper presents a brief summary of the easily available recent 
cross-section data on the demographic components in the international 
)
fertility differentials, with emphasis on the comparison of less develop-
ed (LDCs) and more developed (DCs) regions among the market economies. 
This summary, and the accompanying analytical comments, may be familiar· 
to specialists in demography. But the interrelations of these demo­
graphic aspects, and their possible connotations, are less familiar to 
economists; and the recent additions of data on less developed regions, 
sparsely covered, if at all, in earlier years (most of Africa and much 
of Asia) make it worthwhile to assemble the summary measures. No 
effort was made to go back to the original censuses or monographic 
L 
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studies; and I have relied primarily on the international compilations 
and special papers of the United Nations. The aim w~ a broad survey, 
on the assumption that guidance for a more intensive exploration would 
be provided by such an approach. 
The discussion begins with a review of the age-specific birth 
rates for women in the successive age classes within the childbearing 
span; these, together with number of women in these age classes, 
absolute and in relation to total population, are used to derive the 
crude birth rates. We can then establish the contribution of each age 
class of women to the total crude birth rate of a region. The next 
section reviews marriage proportions among women, derives age-specific 
marital fertility ratios, and measures the contribution to fertility 
differences between the LDCs and DCs of the differences in marriage 
proportions and in intra-marital fertility. The third section compares 
the distributions of births by age of mother, and an approximation to 
the distribution of births by age of father, for the LDCs and the DCs. 
The fourth section summarizes births by birth order or parity, indica­
ting the greater weight of high parity births in the total fertility 
of the LDCs and establishes the association between the incidence of 
births to parents at more advanced ages and the contribution of high 
parity births to higher fertility. The fifth, and last, section 
devoted to statistical evidence deals with the distribution of popu­
lation among households of different size, stressing the association 
between higher fertility and the larger average size of household, or 
higher proportions of larger households, in the LDCs than in the DCs. 
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In the concluding section an attempt is made to indicate what the 
findings contribute to the explanation of persisting.high birth rates 
in the LDCs. 
2. Age Specific Birth Rates, Women 
We begin with a summary of the birth rates of women in the five­
year age classes in the childbearing span from 15 through 49 years of 
age (Table 1). Since these are annual rates, an entry of 124 in line 
1, column 2 means that there were 124 births per year for every 1,000 
women 15-49 years old, or 620 births per 1,000 women over the five 
years covered by that age class. 
The regions distinguished are those of most interest in the 
study of economic growth and levels of living. A more detailed break­
down would, of course, be desirable, but the data and resources are not 
available.· In general, the regional rates are unweighted averages of 
those for individual countries, the presumption being that each country, 
large or small, represents an item of significant evidence. But we 
omitted countries with a population of less than a million, because of 
the possibility of erratic results. Moreover, when large countries 
showed distinctive patterns (as was the case with India and Pakistan, 
compared to other countries in East and Southeast Asia) we todtweighted 
·averages for them separately. Finally, we weighted regional rates ~y 
population in combining them into aggregates for all LDCs and DCs. 
Total fertility is the total of births over the childbearing 
span to 1,000 women, representative of the population covered in a 
specific area. Thus, the entry in line 1, column 9, indicates that 
Table 1 4 
Annual Births Eer 1,000 Women! by Age of Women, Less Developed
And Developed Regions, Early or Middle 1960s 
Number Age of Women Totalof 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Fertil-
Countries ity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
A. Market Economies 
I. Less Developed Regions 
1. East & Southeast
Asia 9 124 275 280 223 154 64 22 5,,.710
la. India-Pakistan 2 158 277 266 209 140 56 24 5,650
lb. Other countries 7 62 268 305 248 179 78 19 5,795
le. Hong Kong &
Singapore 2 48 247 315 237 148 58 8 5,305 
2. Middle East /'9 113 305 352 290 199 82 17 ';;. 6,280 
3. Sub- Sa1 aran Africa 16 183 295 268 219 153 77 32 6,135 
4. Latin America 16 121 296 308 243 181 74 22 6,225 
5. Total, LDCs (lines
1-4, weighted) 131 283 289 231 161 69 23 5 ,935 
II. Developed R&gions
6. Europe 13 32 152 168 106 54 17 1 ~ .550 
7. Overseas Offshoots 4 59 221 208 125 64 19 2 3, 490 
8. Japan l 4 109 192 83 22 4 0 2,070 
9. Total, DCs (lines
6-8 weighted) 38 171 187 110 53 16 1 2, 880 
III. Other Market Economies 
10. Europe 4 18 121 186 147 93 36 4 3,025 
11. Latin America 3 76 203 185 125 78 31 6 3,520 
B. European Communist Economies 
12. Developed 3 49 177 135 78 38 12 2 2,455 
13. Less developed 5 52 173 128 69 34 12 2 2,350 
14. Albania 1 56 275 305 256 189 · 117 58 6,280 
Table 1 (continued) 
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Notes: 
Entries in columns 2-8 for all countries, except the four listed below, are from 
United Nations, Interim Report on Conditions and Trends of Fertility in the World, 1960-
1965, Population Studies, no. 52 (New York, 1972), various Annex tables. We omitted 
countries with population below a million. In general, we took means of the values 
for 1960 and 1965; or the values for one of the two years, if its base was more reliable 
or its coverage more comprehensive. For the Congo (Leopoldville), 1955-57; Guinea, 1955 
India, 1958~59; and the Philippines, 1950-55, data are from United Nations, Population 
Bulletin no. 7, 1963 (New York, 1965), Table 7.1, pp. 102-103. 
Unless otherwise indicated, entries for regions that include more than one country, 
are unweighted arithmetic means of the values for the several countries. The weights, 
when used, are population numbers for 1960 given in United Nations, Population Estimates 
by Regions and Countries, 1950-1960, Working paper ESA/P/WP31, May 1970. 
Line 1: Weighted mean of lines la and lb, the relative population weights (in the 
total comprising other East Asia, excluding North Korea; Middle South Asia, and South­
East Asia excluding North Vietn~being 0.645 for line la and 0.355 for line lb. Line 
le is excluded. 
Line la: Weighted mean with weights of 0.81 for India and 0.19 for Pakistan. 
Line lb: Includes South Korea, Taiwan, West Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Ceylon, 
and the Philippines. 
@ 
Line 2: 1Represents South West Asia and North Africa, and includes Turkey, Iraq, 
Jordan, Syria, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria. 
Line 3: Includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Ghaaa, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, and Upper Vol 
Line 4: Includes Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Chile, Paraguay, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
Jamaica, and Panama. 
Line 5: Weighted averages of lines 1-4. The weights for line 1 as indicated; for 
line 2--populations of South West Asia and North Africa; for line 3--the sum of 
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Table 1 (continued) 
populations of West, East, and Central Africa; for line 4--population of Latin 
America, omitting the Temperate Zone--work out to 63 for line 1, 9 for line 2, and 
14 each for lines 3 and 4.• 
Line 6: Includes Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, 
France, Germany FR, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, England and Wales, and Scotland. 
Line 7: Includes Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Line 9: Weighted averages of lines 6-8. The weights--the population totals 
for Northern and Western Europe, plus Italy (omitting the rest of Southern Europe); 
and for the other regions--work out to 46 for Europe, 38 for overseas offshoots, 
and 16 for Japan. 
Line 10: Includes Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Line 11: Includes Argentina, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico. 
Line 12: Includes U.S.S.R. / Czechoslovakia,and East Germany. 
Line 13: Includes Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Excludes 
Albania shown separately in Line 14. 
Column 9: Sum of rates for seven age classes, multiplied by five (to allow 
for the number of years in each class interval). Each entry shows the total number 
of births over the childlearing span to 1,000 women, aged 15-49, representative 
of the population reflected in the cross-section. 
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1,000 women with the fertility patterns of women in ESE Asia in the 
early 1960s bore 5,710 children through their childbearing span, an 
average of 5.71 births per woman. 
Several findings are suggested. To begin with total fertility, 
bir~h rates per 1,000 women of childbearing ages were,among the market 
economi~s, over twice as high in the LDCs as in the DCs. The few 
European and Latin American economies that did not clearly fit into 
either of these two large groups showed fairly low total fertility, 
closer to that for the DCs than to that for the LDCs. The distinctive, 
and less expected, finding was that among the European Communist 
economies, excluding Albania, fertility was low, even relative to the 
developed countries of Europe; and just as low, or slightly lower, 
among the less developed Communist economies than among the more develop­
ed. Obviously, some aspects of the social and economic structure of 
European Communist.economies restrict fertility, sharply and effectively. 
Second, and more relevant to our specific topic, is the dif­
ference between the LDCs and DCs in the pattern of their age specific 
birth rates over the childbearing span. For the LDCs the rates are 
fairly high not only during the prime ages, from 20 through 29, and 
the next higher class from 30 through 34, but also during the younger 
and older ages. Thus, if we take an age specific birth rate of 100 
(500 births in a five-year interval)to be an index of substantial 
childbearing, we find that such engagement extends over five age 
classes, or 25 years, in the LDCs, and only over three age classes, 
or 15 years in the DCs (lines 5 and 9). 
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Indeed, one could argue that it would be difficult, if not im­
possibl~ to attain a total fertility as high as that found for the LDCs, 
i.e. between 5,700 and 6,800, if births were limited to women 20 through 
34 years old.. With fecundity proportions rising rapidly from about a 
third of all women aged 17 to a peak of 93 percent at age 22, and then 
declining slowly beginning at age 23 and through the early 30s, the 
average proportions of fecund women are 39 percent from age 15-19, 92 
per•cent for age 20-24, 90 percent for age 25-29, and 85 percent for age 
130-34. Given these levels, and observing the record for individual 
countries, we find that a reasonably high age s~ecific rate would average 
350 for the two prime fecundity classes, i.e. 20-24 and 25-29, and about 
300 for the 30-34 class--thus yielding total fertility of 5,000, without 
any births to younger and older women. But this would fall short of the 
total fertility shown in lines 1-5 by between 12 and 26 percent; yet the 
assumed total fertility, given an average married proportion below 90 
percent (see below) would mean, for the three age classes, an average of 
almost six births per married woman over the 15 years. It is unrealistic 
to assume that an average of one birth every two and a half years, over 
a span of fifteen years, can be maintained for every marr.i.ed woman in 
the population. The cumulative total for the three age clas-ses would 
fall short of the 5,000 total fertility level, and the difference, 
like that between 5,000 and 6,000 or more, would have to be made ur 
by fairly high birth rates for younger and older women. 
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Third, if there is an element of necessity about the extended 
pattern of age specific birth rates in the LDCs compared with the more 
concentrated pattern in the DCs, there is still an element of variance 
or choice. In some countries the additional contribution to high total 
fertility occurs largely among women under 20; in others it occurs 
among those 35 or older. Thus in India and Pakistan Cline la), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (line 3), the rate in the 15-19 class is over 150 
per thousand, whereas in the other countries in ESE Asia (line lb), and 
to a lesser extent in the Middle East (line 2), the rate for the 15-19 
class is relatively low, 62 or 113. And, as one would expect, when the 
time pattern is extended toward early ages, the specific rates at the 
later ages tend to be lower than when the time pattern is not extended 
back of age 20. Thus, for India and Pakistan, and Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the rates for age 30-34 are 209 and 219 respectively, compared with the 
much higher rates for other countries in ESE Asia and in the Middle 
East (248 and 290 respectively). Also, when the birth rates are fairly 
high in the 15-19 class, the rate tends to be at the peak in the. 20-24 
class, declining somewhat in the 25-29 class; where as in regions with 
relatively low rates at the early ages, the peak is reached in the 25-29 
class. The differences indicated between the India-Pakistan and Sub­
Saharan regions, on the one hand, and the Middle East and other ESE 
Asia, clearly reflect different institutional conditions governing age 
of marriag~ particularly of women, and suggest the diversity of age 
patterns that can be associated with a high level of total fertility. 2 
Finally, it follows that the excess of fertility in the LDCs 
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over that in the DCs may be accounted for by higher birth rates of the 
former, partly in the young ages (below 20), partly in the prime ages 
(20-34), and partly in the older ages (35 and over). However, we are 
interested in a comparison not of total fertility, but of crude birth 
rates--for it is crude birth rates, in combination with crude death 
rates, that yield the rate of natural increase, or natural growth of 
population--with its effects on economic growth and structure. We must, 
therefore, shift now to the links between total fertility and crude 
birth rates: the relative size of each age class of women of child­
bearing ages; and the proportion of all women of childbearing ages to 
total population. Table 2 summarizes the data on both links, shows 
the res·ultant aggregate crude birth ratesJ and measures the contribu­
tion to the differences in the crude birth rates made by women in 
each age class within the childbearing span. 
Panel A reveals that the relative magnitude of the age classes 
among women in the less developed areas declines significantly as 
we move from the youngest group, 15-19 years of age, to the oldest 45-49. 
A simple geometric mean of the relatives of the two youngest and the 
two oldest classes, for the LDCs as a whole (line 5) yields a rate of 
rise from the older to the younger groups of 3.3 percent per year (we 
prefer to think of it as a rise toward the younger, rather than a 
decline toward the older, age groups). This result is not surprising: 
the younger groups are larger than. the older because they are members 
of a larger population, i.e. are survivors of a birth cohort that, 




Age Distribution of Women Within the Childbearing Span, and 
Contribution to Crude Birth Rates, Less Developed and 
Developed Market Economies, Early or Middle 1960s 
A. Number in Successive Age Classes as Relatives of Average Number 
per Class Within Childbearing Span Women 15-49 
as% ofAge Class of Women Total 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ESE Asia 1.45 1.31 1.19 0.98 0.82 0.68 0.57 23.1 
2. Middle East 1.47 1.32 1.17 0.99 0.80 0.67 0.57 22.5 
3. Sub-Saharan 
Africa 1.53 1.32 1.13 0.96 0.81 0.68 0.56 23.4 
4. Latin America 1.53 1.30 1.11 0.97 0.82 0.69 0.57 22.8 
5. LDCs 1.48 1.31 1.17 , o. 98 0.82 0.68 0.57 23.0 
6. Europe 1.02 1.04 0.98 1.02 1.09 0.82 1.02 23.9 
7. Overseas 
offshoots 1.12 0.94 0.93 1.02 1.07 0.99 0.92 23.1 
8. Japan 1.28 1.16 1.14 1.04 0.91 0.76 0.71 27.0 
9. DCs 1.10 1.03 0.99 1.02 1.05- 0.87 0.93 24.1 






Age Class of Women 
25-29 30-34 35-39 













10. ESE Asia 180 360 333 219 126 44 13 6,375 42.1 
11. Middle East 166 403 412 287 159 55 10 7,460 47.9 
12. Sub-Saharan 
Africa 280 389 303 210 124 52 18 6,880 46.0 
13. Latin America 185 385 339 236 150 51 13 6,795 44.3 
14. LDCs 194 371 338 226 132 47 13 6,605 43.4 
15. Europe 33 158 165 108 59 14 1 2,690 18.4 
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Table 2 (continued) 





















17. Japan 5 126 219 86 20 3 0 2,295 17.7 
18. DCs 42 176 185 112 56 14 1 2,930 20.2 
c. Contributions to Crude Birth Rate, by Age of Women 

















19. ESE Asia 5.9 11.9 11.0 7.2 4.2 1.5 0.4 42.1 
20. Middle East 5.3 12.9 13.2 9.2 5.1 1.8 0.4 47.9 
21. Sub-Saharan 
Africa 9.5 13.0 10.1 7.0 4.1 1.7 0.6 46.0 
22. Latin America 6.0 12.5 11.1 7.7 4.9 1.7 0.4 44.3 
23. LDCs 6.4 12.2 11.1 7.4 4.4 1.5 0.4 43.4 
24. Europe 1.1 5.4 5.7 3.7 2.0 0.5- 0 18.4 
25. Overseas 
offshoots 2.2 6.9 6.3 4.2 2.3 0.6 0.1 22.6 
26. Japan 0.1 4.8 8.6 3.3 0.8 0.1 0 17.7 
27. DCs 1.4 6.1 6.4 3.8 1.9 0.5 0.1 20.2 
Contribution to Differences in CBR 
28. Line 23 minus 
line 27 5.0 6.1 4.7 3.6 2.5 1.0 0.3 23.• 2 
29. Line 28 as % 
of ·Total 22 26 20 16 11 4 1 100 
13 
Table 2 (continued) 
Notes: 
Panel A: Calculated from the 1960 population data by age and sex given in the 
United Nations working paper cited in the notes to Table 1. For line 1 we used the 
sum of Other East Asia, Middle South Asia, and South East Asia: for line 2--the sum 
of South West Asia and North Africa; for line 3--the sum of Western Eastern, and 
Middle Africa; for line 4--the total for Latin America, minus the subtotal for the 
Temperate Zone. Line 5 was derived from summation of the four regions as defined 
above. For line 6 we used the sum for Northern, Western Europe, and Italy; for 
line 7--the sum for North America and Austraiia~New Zealand. Line 9 was derived from 
summation of the three regions as defined. 
Panel B: Columns 1-7 were calculated by applying to the age-specific rates for 
the regions, the LDCs, and the DCs (in table 1) the relatives shown in the 
corresponding columns and lines of this table (in Panel A). Column 8 is the sum of 
rates in columns 1-7, multiplied by five (see notes to column 9 of Table 1). 
Column 9 is obtained by dividing the entries in column 8 by 35 (the number of years 
within the 15-49 span), and multiplying the result by the proper fraction that all 
women aged 15-49 form in total population (see column 8 of P~el A). 
Panel C: The shares of the rates of each age class to the total for women 
15-49, in columns 1-7 of lines 10-18 were applied to the total crude birth rate shown 
for each region, for the LDCs, and for the DCs,in column 9 of Panel B. 
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represented by the older classes. Furthermore, the older groups would 
have been smaller, even with the same initial birth cohort, because of 
the longer cumulation of attrition by death. And it is not difficult 
to derive the 3.3 percent rate as a combination of a past population 
growth rate of about 2.5 percent (within some range) and age specific 
death rates over the span from 15-19 to 45-49 of say 5 per 1,000 per 
year. 
Since both past population growth rates, and the death rates 
within the relevant span, were much lower for the DCs than for the 
LDCs, one would expect a correspondingly lower rate of rise for the 
former in the numbezs,moving from the older to the younger classes. 
among women. And indeed the rate derived from the geometric means of 
the two classes at each end is 0.7 (see line 9). The rate is clearly 
too low, for the usual growth rates for population of the developed 
regions has been well over 1 percent per year, and to this must be 
added the allowance for the survival rates from ages 15 through 49. 
Apparently, World War II and the marked fluctuations of birth rates 
in many developed regions over the last four to five decades have 
distorted the age pattern, and, .il particular, made for somewhat larger 
relative numbers among the older age groups within the childbearing 
_span. In the sense that the factors involved were transitory, the 
contrast between the low implicit growth rates within the female 
population of the DCs and LDCs is exaggerated, although it is in the 
expected direction. 
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. O?viously, the much greater numbers in the younger groups, with 
their markedly higher age specific birth rates, yield a weighted total 
fertility measure appreciably higher than the unweighted. When we 
apply, in Panel B, the weights derived in Panel A, the weighted total 
fertility measure for the LDCs is 6,606 (line 14, col. 8), compared 
with the unweighted 5,935 (in line 5, col. 9 of Table 1)--a rise of 
eleven percent. The shift for the DCs is from 2,880 in Table 1 to 
2,930 in Table 2, a rise of only two percent. 
The other link in shifting from the properly weighted total 
fertility to the crude birth rate is the proportion of all women of 
childbearing ages to total population (Panel A, col. 8). With higher 
birth rates and rates of natural increase, and, as before, disregarding 
the possible effects of international migration, the shares of women 
aged 15-49 in total population might be somewhat lower for the LDCs 
than for the DCs. And, indeed, the shares are 23 and 24 percent 
respectively--but the difference is too slight to offset the dif­
ferential raising effects on total fertility of the adjustment ·for 
the size of the successive age classes within the childbearing span. 
With adjusted total fertility, and the share of all women 
aged 15-49 in total population, we can infer the crude birth rate 
(Panel B, col. 9). For the LDCs, the crude birth rate works out to 
43.4 per 1,000; for the DCs to 20.2--a ratio of 2.15, compared with 
a ratio of unadjusted total fertility in Table 1 of 2.06. The infer­
red birth rates compare well with those given directly in the United 
Nations sources: for 1960-64, the weighted average for the LDCs 
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is 42.8 per thousand, for the DCs 19.8--both slightly lower than 
in Table 2, but with the same relative magnitudes. 3 And the regional 
differentials within the two large groups are about the same, except 
that here the rate is higher for the Middle East than for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and in the United Nations estimates that for Sub-Saharan Africa 
is higher. 
Having the crude birth rates corresponding to the weighted age 
specific rates for women, we can calculate the absolute contribution of 
the births credited to a given age class of women to the aggregate crude 
birth rate for a given region (Panel C). This automatic calculation 
permits us to observe the age class origin of the differences in the 
crude birth rates between any two groups of countries. For our purposes 
the most interesting is the distribution of the differences in crude 
birth rates between the LDCs and DCs taken as wholes (lines 28-29). 
About six-tenths of the total excess of the crude birth rate 
of the LDCs over those of the DCs was due to the higher age specific 
birth rates in the three prime age classes--those from 20 through 34. 
Over a fifth was due to the higher birth rates of the young, below 
20. About a sixth, 16 percent, was due to the higher birth rates 
among the older women. Thus the younger and older women combined 
accounted for almost four-tenths of the differential in the aggreg­
ate crude birth rates. To put it differently, if the fertility of 
younger and older women were the same in the LDCs and DCs, the ratio 
of the total birth rate of the former to that of the latter would 
have been 1.7 to 1, not almost 2.2 to 1 as shown in Table 2. 
17 
Applications of the type just made in Table 2, and similar ones 
measuring the contributions of other characteristics of mothers, fathers, 
or births to be made in the sections that follow, are obviously not 
explanations. They do not indicate the causative factors (decisions by 
would-be parents, and elements underlying these decisions) that may 
have been involved in producing the birth rates found. They do, however, 
narrow the locus of the results, and the measures of the different aspects 
of the parents or of the births may narrow it differently. Hopefully 
then the causative factors will be more easily perceived, although room 
will remain for divergent explanatory hypotheses. 
3. Married Proportions, Women 
A woman, no matter what her marital status, can become a mother~ 
whether single, or divorced, or separated, or widowed, she can, provided 
she is of childbearing age, have children if she finds a mate. As evi­
dence, in many countries where legal marriage is prevalent, illegitimate 
births are distinguished. Conversely, a married woman, even if of 
childbearing age, and not naturally sterile, does not necessarily have 
children--voluntary control over intra-marital fertility having become 
increasingly prevalent particularly in modern societies. Furthermore, 
in many countries, stable, non-legally certified, common law or 
consensual marriages are widespread; and these have been included 
here among marriages and the resulting births classified as legitimate. 
The fact is that we deal here with a social institution, not a 
biological process. Consequently, we confront a diversity of meanings 
18 
and institutional framework, particularly in international comparisons 
that span a wide range of societies. Not only is it difficult to 
establish comparability for analytical relevance, but the data available 
are subject to greater error reflecting biases in judgment of respondents 
in terms of preferred marital status. Yet, the institution does have 
meaning in the fertility process in most societies. The latter involves 
long-term union between men and women setting up families as lasting 
units for the major purpose of having children and rearing them toward 
independence and adequate status in society at their maturity. If we 
include consensual or common law marriages as stable unions, as we 
should, the proportions of total births that are recognized as il­
legitimate are substantial only in Western societies with a strict 
legal marriage code and concomitant individual permissiveness. Even so, 
illegitimate births account for a moderate fraction of total births 
(ranging up to 15 percent in Sweden). 
4 Furthermore, many illegitimate 
births may, in leading to a long-term, legal marriage, become legitimate 
retroactively, for all intents and purposes. 
Marriage, as defined here, implies a long-term commitment to a 
union, involves family formation, and also, in the dominant proportion 
of cases, a commi1ment to children. Therefore, despite statistical 
difficulties and ambiguities, it must be considered, and i·:s relevant 
quantitative aspects summarized. Such a summary, for the marriage 
proportions among women, by age classes, is provided in Table 3. 
In general, the _proportions of younger women who are married 
are higher in the LDCs than in the DCs. This is particularly true 
19 
Table 3 
Proportions of Married (Including Consensual and Polygamous 
Marriages) Women by Age Classes, Less Developed and Developed Market 
Economies, 1960s 
Number Age Classes 
of 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Less Developed 
1. ESE Asi~weighted 11 53.2 82.7 91.5+ 90.9 87.5- 79.4 72.0 
la. India-Pakistan, 
weighted 2 70.3 91.8 94.l 91.5- 87.1 77.6 69.8 
I 
lb. Other eountries 
9 22.1 66.0 86.8 89.8 88.l 82.6 75.9 
2. Middle East 
8 34.9 78.6 89.4 91.4 89.4 84.3 77.2 
3. Sub-Saharan Africa 14 54.4 86.8 91.4 91.4 89.3 83.8 75.0 
4. Latin America 
13 17.5+ 55.2 73.5 77.7 78.8 75.0 70.0 
5. Total, LDC, weighted 46.7 79.1 88.8 89.2 86.7 79.8 72.7 
Developed 
6. Europe 13 5.0 47.7 79.3 85.7 85.8 83.7 80.4 
7. Overseas Offshoots 4 9.8 60.1 84.6 88.7 88.6 86.8 83.6 
8. Japan 1 1.3 31.4 79.7 88.0 87.5 84.9 79.1 
9. Total DCs, Weighted 6.2 49.8 81.4 87.2 87.0 85.1 81.4 
Notes 
The underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1968, and 
Demographic Yearbook, 1971, New York, 1969 and 1972 respectively. 
Throughout, the share of married women, for a given age class, was to a total 
excluding those whose marital status was unknown. 




The following countries were included, with the year of coverage indicated 
in parentheses; Line la: India (1951), Pakistan (1961); Line lb: Ceylon (1967), 
Nepal (1961), Indonesia (1964-65, sample), Khmer (1962), Korea (1966), Taiwan (1956), 
West Malaysia (1957), Philippines (1960), Thailand (1960); Line 2: Iran (1966), 
Turkey (1965), Iraq (1965), Jordan (1961), United Arab Republic (1960), Tunisia 
(1966), Morocco (1960), Algeria (1966); Line 3: Chad (African population 1963-64, 
sample), Central African Republic (1959-60), Angola (1960), Dahomey (African 
population, 1961), Congo (Kinshasa) (1955-57), Guinea (1955), MaLL (1960-61), Kenya 
(1962), Liberia (1962), Madagascar (1966, sample), Senegal (African population 
(1961), Togo (1958-60), Uganda (1963), Zambia (1969); Line 4: Costa Rica (1963), 
Brazil (1970), Guatemala (1964), Honduras (1961), Ecuador (1962), Mexico (1960), 
El Salvador (1961), Panama (1960), Chile (1970), Colombia (1964), Paraguay (1962), 
Peru (1961), Venezuela (1961). 
For lines 6-8 the coverage is that given in Table 1. 
For a few countries adjustments had to be made to estimate the proportion 
for the standard age class' (when two were combined, or the lower limit of the 
youngest class was different from 15 years of age). These adjustments were 
based on neighboring age classes, or on other countries in the region. The 
possible errors involved were minor, and it seemed best to include at least the 
larger countries. 
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of the 15-19 age class: almost half of all women in the LDCs are mar­
ried, compared with only 6 percent in the DCs. It is also true of the 
20-24 age class, in which the proportions are close to 80 percent and 
about 50 percent, respectively. Only for woman 25 or older are the 
married proportions in the two groups of countries similarly high. And, 
in fact, for women 35 or older, the married proportions are larger in 
the DCs than in the LDCs--largely because the incidence of widowhood 
is less marked, proportionately, in the former. 
In addition to this broad, and expected, finding, there are 
significant differences in the proportions of married women in the 
younger classes among the several regions within the less developed 
group~ and a question arises about the statistical limitations of 
those shown for Latin America. The latter are far below those for 
any other less developed region; and the higher level of economic develop­
ment in Latin America would not explain this shortfall, since the pro­
portions are lower even for the older age classes. The possible ex­
planation may be that, with the prevalence of consensual marriages in 
Latin America, there is a ma~ked tendency (stronger among men, but 
presumably true also of women) by some partners in consensual marriages 
to report themselves as single. 5 The married proportions in the 15-19 
_class are distinctly higher for India-Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa 
than for the other countries in ESE Asia, Middle East, and Latin 
America (the latter even allowing for some understatement). These 
differences conform roughly to the differences in the age specific 
birth rate for the 15-19 class in.Table 1--which is higher for India-
Pakistan and Sub-Saharan Africa than for the others. Such differences 
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in marriage proportions persist in the 20-24 class, although they are 
much narrower than in the 1s~19 class; and they are apparently too slight 
to be reflected in the age specific birth rates for the 20-24 class. 
(Table 1, column 3, lines 1-4, shows no significant differences in birth 
rates for this age class among the several regions.) 
Since in the comparison of the LDCs with the DCs, the differentials 
in marriage proportions in the younger classes among women are roughly 
consonant with differences in fertility levels, we related the age 
specific birth rates for age classes of all women to the married pDO­
portions, deriving age specific marital fertility rates. These are 
given in Table 4, lines 1 and 2. 
Obviously, we introduced an error in relating all birth5>includ-
ing illegitimate)in a given age class of women to the married proportions 
within that age class. The ratios overstate marital fertility, particular­
ly in the ages in which marriage proportions are low and the ratios of all 
mothers to married mothers are high. But the exaggeration should affect 
both the LDCs and the DCs, and its impact is reduced by combining the 
two young classes--15-19 and 20-24--with due allowance, of course, for 
the difference in size, total and married. 
Because of the striking, and suspect, differences in age specific 
marital fertility in the two young classes taken separately, we combine 
them. For the two combined, or up to_age 25, the age specific fertility 
adjusted for the difference in married proportions is no higher among 
the LDCs than among the DCs--if anything, it is significantly lower, 
although some allowance must be made for differential errors in 
exaggeration (lines 1 and 2). To put it differently, the age 
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Table 4 
Births per 1,000 Married Women, and Effects of Differences 
in Marriage Proportions versus Differences in Births per 
1,000 Married Women on Differences in Fertility Between 
Less Developed and Developed Market Economies 
Age Classes of Women 
15-19 20..;24 15-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Total Births, Eer 1,000 Married Women 
1. LDCs 281 nc374 326 325 259 186 86 32 
2. DCs 613 344 374 230 126 61 19 1 nc 
Effect of Differences in ProEortions of Married Women 
3. Assumed identical 
birth rates per 
1,000 married women 350 278 193 124 53 17 nc 
4. Married proportions, 
LDCs (%) 61.9 88.8 89.2 86.7 79.8 72. 7 nc 
5. Married Proportions, 
DCs (%) 27.3 81.4 87.2 87.0 85.1 81.4 nc 
6. Derived age specific 
BRs, LDCs 217 247 173 108 42 12 5,080 
7. Derived age specific 
BRs, DCs 96 226 168 108 45 13 3,760 
8. Derived BRs, LDCs, 
weighted by relative 
size of age class 605 289 170 88 29 7 5,940 
9. Derived BRs, DCs, weighted 
by relative size of age 
class 204 221 171 113 39 12 3,800 
Effect of Differences in Births Eer 1,000 Married Women 
10. Assumed identical marriage 
proportions (%) 44.6 85.1 88.2 86.8 82.5 77 .o nc 
11. Derived age specific BRs, 
LDCs 145 277 228 161 71 25 5,310 
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Table 4 (continued) 
12. Derived age specific 
BRs, DCs 167 196 111 53 16 1 3,555 
13. Derived BRs, LDCs, weighted 
by relative size of age 
class 395 324 223 132 48 14 5,680 
14. Derived BRs, DCs, weighted 
by relative size of age 
class 356 194 113 56 14 1 3,670 
Allocation of Differences in Total Fertility Between LDCs and DCs 
Aggregate Effects of Differ- Effects of Differ-
Differences ences in Marriage ences in Births per 
Proportion Married Woman 
(1) (2) (3) 
15. Total fertility not 
weighted 3,055 1,320 1,755 
16". Total fertility 
weighted 3,635 2,140 2,010 
nc -- not calculated 
Notes: 
Lines 1 and 2: For the standard size classes obtained by dividing the age 
specific birth rates in Table 1 (lines 5 and 9) by the marriage proportions (treated 
as proper fractions) in Table 3 (lines 5 and 9). For the 15-24 class (column 3), 
we derived the joint age specific rate (analogous to that in Table 1) by using the 
weights of the two classes (15-19, and 20-24) as given in the relevant columns and 
lines of Table 2; calculated the joint marriage proportion by using the weights for 
the two classes again from Table 2; and then divided the joint age specific birth 
rate by the joint marriage proportion. 
Line 3: Arithmetic means of the BRs in line 1 and 2. 
Lines 4 and 5: From Table 3, lines 5 and 9, with the calculation for the 
joint class (15-24) as indicated above. 
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.Table 4 (continued) 
Lines 6 and 7: Birth rates in line 3 multiplied by the married proportions 
in lines 4 and 5 (treated as proper fractions). Total fertility in column 9 is five 
times the sum of the class fertilities (with that for 19-24 multiplied by two). 
Lines 8 and 9: The weights for the relatives of the size classes are from 
Table 2, lines 5 and 9. These are applied to the derived age specific BRs in lines 
6 and 7. Total fertility (column 9) is five times the sum of the entries in 
columns 3-8. 
Line 10: Aritmetic means of the married proportions in lines 4 and 5. 
Lines 11 and 12: The BRs given in lines 1 and 2 respectively multiplied 
by the assumed marriage proportions (treated as proper fractions) in line 10. 
Lines 13 and 14: The age specific birth rates, derived for the age classes 
in lines 11-22, are weighted by the relative size of these classes, given in 
Table 2, lines 5 and 9. 
Lines 15 and 16: Column 1: differences between total fertility of LDCs and 
DCs, unweighted (from lines 5 and 9, column 9 of Table l); and weighted (from lines 
14 and 18, column 8, Table 2). Column 2: differences between lines 6 and 7, column 9; 
and lines 8 and 9, column 9. Column 3: differences between lines 11 and 12, and 13 
and 14, column 9. 
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specific fertility in the LDCs up to age 25 (cumulatively) is higher 
than that in the DCs only in association with the much higher marriage 
proportions, i.e. the earlier incidence of marriage among the women in 
the LDCs than in the DCs. Only in the older ages, when the marriage 
proportions in the LDCs no longer rise, and those in the DCs catch up, 
do differences in marriage proportions cease to have any effect on the 
age specific fertility rates for women, or rather on the differentials 
between these rates for the LDCs and the DCs. 
The finding is hardly surprising. Indeed, it is, in a way, a 
necessary consequence of the difference in marriage incidence at the 
younger ages between the LDCs and DCs. If in the DCs marriage pro­
portions at the early ages are low--and they were below 50 percent 
through the ages of 21-23-- those women who did marry were a group with 
a high propensity toward having children. The much wider groups of 
younger married women in the LDCs would, therefore, be unlikely to 
match the marital fertility rates of these rather exceptional early 
starters among the young women in the DCs. It is the dominant propor­
tion of married women that is the primary cause of the higher marital 
fertility of the LDCs. And yet the finding is of cardinal importance 
in interpreting the birth rate differentials between the LDCs and the 
DCs. To the extent that these differentials in the early ages are so 
closely associated with differences in marriage proportions, the 
finding emphasizes the early entry of women into the childbearing 
family and the early withdrawal of such women for outside activities. 
Indeed, in many LDCs, a young woman, sheltered in her parental home, 
moves immediately to marriage, without participating directly in any 
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non-domestic activity through much of her youth and childbearing span. 
Thus, some light is shed on the structure of the fam~ly, particularly 
with regard to the ages and experiences of wife and husband. We shall 
find below that this early entry into marriage is not typical df men 
in the LDCs; and that the age difference between husbands and wives is 
significally wider in the LDCs than in the DCs .• 
Given the age specific birth rates per 1,000 married women, and 
the proportions which relate married to all women by age classes, the 
differences in total fertility between the LDCs and the DCs can be 
decomposed--into those of differences due to marriage proportions (for 
identical marital fertility ratios) and those due to marital fertility 
(for identical marriage proportions in the comparable age classes of 
women). The calculation appears in lines 3-13 of Table 4; and the sum­
mary of the two sets of effects on unweighted total fertility, or on 
total fertility weighted as it was in Table 2, is shown in lines 15 and 
16. 
The sum of the two sets of effects does not equal the total, 
particularly in line 16, because of intercorrelation between marriage pro­
portions and age specific marital fertility. And there are, of 
course, the limitations already noted on the use of total births in 
relation to married women. But the rough magnitude of the findings 
would be little affected by refinements. The general suggestion is 
that between four-tenths and a half of the difference in total fertility 
between the LDCs and DCs is due to differences in marriage proportions; 
and the balance to intra-marital fertility differences. These weights 
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should be taken only as a general indication that differences in mar­
riage proportions, among younger women, play a large part, if we assume 
that early marriage is a pre-condition of the wide age-specific birth 
rate differences in the ages below 25 and 30. Indeed, it follows.auto­
matically from the two findings already noted: (1) that excess of birth 
rates for the age group below 30, either in Table 1 or Table 2, would 
account for about a half of the total fertility differentials; (2) that 
up to the age between 25 and 30 the higher birth rates of women in the 
LDCs are completely accounted for by their higher marriage proportions. 
In this sense, the evidence in the present section is a refinement, a 
detail in understanding how the much higher age specific birth rates 
for the younger women in the LDCs are attained. 
4. Married Proportions, Men, and Distribution of Births by Age of Father 
We are concerned here with two questions. The first relates to 
the ages of married men compared with those of their wives, for the LDCs 
and the DCs. We shall find that women who marry at an early age marry 
much older men in the LDCs, and the excess of a husband's age over that 
of his wife is far wider than in the DCs. Obviously then the structure 
within the family household differs in the two groups of countries, The 
decision activity of a household composed of an older husband and a younger 
wife must differ from that of a household in which the ages, and implicitly 
experience in the -outside world, of husband and wife do not differ as much. 
The second question concerns the distribution of births by age of father. 
If, in general, husbands are older relative to their wives in the LDCs 
than in the DCs, and if, as already observed, childbearing continues to 
older women (within their childbearing span) in the LDCs than in the 
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Des, the contribution of older fathers to the crude birth rate must 
be far greater in the LDCs than in the DCs. And we shall find that a 
substantial proportion of births in the LDCs can be credited to fathers 
of 40 years or over. This finding sheds further light on the deter­
minants of the higher birth rates in the LDCs. 
Unfortunately, the available data do not directly yield the 
comparisons and distributions which we seek. Some manipulation and 
restrictive assumptions must be made before even approximate answers 
can be reached. Yet the statistical difficulties are of interest in 
themselves because they reflect substantial international differences 
in the marriage institutions and differences in the degree of connec­
tion of children to their fathers compared with that of children to 
their mothers. 
We begin with the marriage proportions of men, that are to be 
compared with marriage proportions of women, both for comparable age class­
es. Our intent is to derive, for comparison with the distribution of 
married women aged 15-4~ a distribution of their husbands by age. In 
this attempt, we immediately run into difficulties. In the first place, 
for many less developed countries (but for none of the developed), the 
reported number of married men is significantly short of the reported 
number of married women.despite the inclusion of the consensually 
married. The remaining categories are single, widowed, and separated. 
Yet if reporting is accurate, if polygamy is not practiced, and if 
differential international migration (in which case shortages of 
husbands in some countries would be offset by excesses in others) is 
disregarded, the numbers of all married men and women (albeit of dif-
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ferent ages) should be identical. 
The explanation is, in good part, that polygamy is practiced in 
many countries. In fact, for several sub-Saharan countries, the United 
Nations Demographic Yearbooks report numbers of men with two wives, 
three wives, and so on; and for several Middle-Eastern Moslem countries 
they report marriages of men already married. The shortage of husbands 
reported for Latin America, where consensual marriages are common, 
suggests that some p0lygamous marriages are also included. The alterna­
tive, and contributory assumption, is that even when a consensual mar­
riage is monogamous, there is a greater tendency among men than among 
women not to report themselves as married. 
We must match husbands and wives, for married women in their 
childbearing ages, and compare the ages of husbands and wives, since 
they affect decisions regarding children, and in order to derive dis­
tributions of births by age of father. For this purpose only monogamous 
marriages can be handled easily. We have, therefore, excluded from 
lines 1 and 2 of Table 5 all countries in which number of married men 
fell short of that of married women by more than a few percentage 
points (there were no opposite pairings). This meant eliminating all 
Sub-Saharan African countries (except Madagascar, which would not 
contribute much); and also many Latin American countries. As already in­
dicated, this problem did not arise in the case of the DCs. Although 
illegitimate births and informal departures from monogamy do occur, 
they are not legally recognized, nor are they recorded in any way 
within the statistically established marital status categories. 
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Table 5 
Married Proportions, and Age Partition Values for Distributions 
of Married Men and Women and of Births by Age of Mother and 
Father, Less Developed and Developed Countries, 1960s 
A.. Married Proportions for Men (and Women, Comparable Coverage) 
Age Classes 
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LDCs 
1. Men 11.2 40.9 69.5- 85.8 89.7 89.7 89.1 
2. Women (comparable 
coverage) 42.6 75.9 87.9 88.7 86.2 79.1 73.7 
DCs 
3. Men 1.1 24.6 65.2 82.5 86.6 88.0 88.2 
4. Women (comparable 
coverage, Table 3) 6.2 49.8 81.4 87.2 87.0 85.1 81.4 
B. Partition Values for Panel A 
LDCs DCs 
1st 3rd 1st 3rd 
quart. Median quart. quart. Median quart. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
5. Wives, 15-49, 
comparable coverage 23.4 29.7 37.6 28.7 35.4 . 42.2 
6. Corresponding mar-
ried men (husbands, 
see text) 28.7 36.6 46.9 31.5 38.3 45.5 
Age differentials 
between LDCs & DCs 
7. Wives (line 5) . . . . -5.3 -5.7 -4.6 
8. Husbands (line 6). . . . . . . . . . . -2.8 -1.7 1.4 
9. Age excess, husbands' 
over wives (line 6 minus 
line 5) 5.3 6.9 9.3 2.92.8 3.3 
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Table 5 (continued) 
C. Partition Values, Wives and Mothers (based on Tables 2 and 3) 
LDCs DCs 
1st 3rd 1st 3rd 
quart. Median quart. quart. Median quart. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
10. Wives, 15-49 23.1 29.5 37.4 28.7 35.4 42.2 
11. Mothers, 15-49 21.8 26.4 31.9 23.0 27.0 31.6 
Age differentials between 
LDCs and DCs 
12. Wives (line 10) . -5.6 -5.9 -4.8 
13. Mothers (line 11) -1.2 -0.6 0.3 
14. Lead of age partition 
values, mothers over 
wives (line 11 minus 
line 10) -1.3 -3.1 -5.5 -5.7 -8.4 -10.6 
D. Derivation of A~e Partition Values, Distribution of Births hr 
Age of Father 
15. Corrected partition 
values, married men 
(line 10 + line 9) 28.4 36.4 46.7 31.5 38.3 45.5 
16. Alternative partition 
values, married men 
(using median differ-
ence only) 30.0 36.4 44.3 31.6 38.6 45.1 
17. Partition ages, 
fathers (line 15 + 
line 14) 27.1 33.3 41.2 25.8 29.9 34.9 
18. Alternative partition 
ages, fathers (line 
16 plus line 14) 28.7 33.3 38.8 25.9 29.9 34.5 
Age differentials between 
LDCs and DCs 
19. Line 17 . 1.3 3.4 6.4 
20. Line 18 . . . . . . 2.8 3.4 4.3 
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Notes: 
Lines 1-2: The sources of data for individual countries are those cited in the 
notes to Table 3. For reasons given in the text only those countries were used for 
which the total numbers of married women and men for the given year differed by only 
a few percent (well below 10). The following countries were included: for ESE Asia 
(10)--Ceylon, Indonesia, Khmer, S. Korea, Taiwan, India, West Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, and Thailand--with the usual weighting within the region; for the Middle 
East (8)--Iran, Turkey, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and UAR; for Sub-Saharan 
Africa--none; for Latin America (11)--Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. The usual weighting by 
total population in 1960 was followed in combining the three major regions covered. 
Lines 3-4: Coverage is that given in the notes to Tables 1 and 3, from the same 
sources. 
Line 5: The product of the proportions married within the successive age classes, 
15-49 (in lines 2 and 4 above) and the relative weight of each age class (from Table 2, 
lines 5 and 9) is the distribution of married women, 15-49, by five-year age classes. 
(The use of class weights for all LDCs, from Table 2, is justified because the relative 
weights of the age classes in the omitted region (Sub-Saharan Africa) are quite close to 
those of the LDCs as a whole (see Table 2, lines 3 and 5). From the distributions we 
derive, by linear interpolation, the three age partition values shown. 
Line 6: The ha.sic assumption here is that younger husbands are matched with 
younger wives. Knowing the distribution of married men and of married women, for the 
same countries and years, we can then calculate the partition age of husbands 
corresponding to the partition age of wives. The weights for age classes among men used 
in the calculation were the same as those for age classes among women. The close 
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similarity of the two is shown in the distributions for large regions in the UN Working 
Paper cited in the notes to Panel A of Table 2. 
Line 10: The underlying proportions of married women within each age class are 
from Table 3, lines 5 and 9. The relative weights are from Table 2, lines 5 and 9; 
and the procedure is the same as that for line 5 above. 
Line 7: Table 2, lines 23 and 27 show the contribution of each age class within 
the total of all women 15-49 to the crude birth rate (or to total births), for the 
LDCs and DCs respectively. From these two distributions we derive, again by linear 
interpolation, the age partition values. Since we are assuming that all births are 
by married women, the distributions of births by age of mother by age of married mother 
are identiaal. 
Line 16: Instead of matching the youngest husbands to the youngest wives (as 
was done for line 6 above), which yields a widening excess of age of husband over age 
of wife as the age of wives increases, here we assume a constant age differential 
between husbands and wives and set it at the differential at the median partition 
value. An element of matching younger husbands to younger wives still remains, but 
only in the sense that for all wives, 15-49, the younger group of husbands (in equal 
number) is selected among the total of married men. But there is no selectivity within 
the age span of wives 15-49. 
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Obviously, the exclusion of bigamous and polygamous marriages from the 
LDC estimates probably means an underestimate of the excess of the age 
of husbands over that of wives. The weighted excess of a husband's 
age over that of all of his several wives would presumably be greater 
than the excess in monogamous pairings. A man usually acquires his 
second. or third wife as he grows older and his economic status improves. 
Moreover, he usually selects much younger second and third mates. 
But we have to go beyond the married proportions for men and 
women separately, toward some approximation to the relative ages of 
wives and their husbands. For this purpose the age distribution of 
married men must be linked to that of married women. No problem 
would arise if data were available on the cross-classification of 
married couples by ages of husband and wife; or if data on the ages 
of brides and grooms at time of marriage were available, cross-classi­
fied, for an adequate sample of countries. But neither body of data 
is provided in the international compilations of demographic informa­
tion; and a search in the records of individual countries was not 
practicable here. Hence we attempted an approximation by the use of 
some plausible assumptions (Panel B). 
The distributions of married women, 15-49, by age class, can 
be derived from marriage proportions and the data in Table 2 on the 
relative size of each age class; and the quartiles and medians in 
line 5 can then be estimated directly. These estimates show that the 
quartile and median ages of married women (within the childbearing span) 
in the LDCs are about five years below those in the DCs (line 7). But 
we would like a similar set of partition values for the married men, 
who can be viewed as husbands of the married women aged 15-·49, since 
these men are the most involved in decisions on the production of the 
next generation. The corresponding partition values for m2.rried men 
(husbands) in line 6 are derived on the assumption that younger married 
men should be matched with younger married women--perhaps the most 
plausible of alternative simple assumptions. Using the principle in 
matching and having the age distribution of married men, we assign a 
number equal to that of the first quartile of the distribution of 
married women--to establish the age partition value that separates this 
number from all other, older married men; and continue up the age scale 
for married women, and corespondingly, married men. 
Three related conclusions emPrge. First, whereas married women, 
age 15-49, were about five years younger in the LDCs than in the DCs, 
the husbands of these women in the LDCs were only slightly younger at 
the median than the husbands in the DCs (less than 2 years); and at the 
third quartile of the distribution they were distinctly older (lines 
7 and 8). Second, the age excess of husbands over wives (the latter 
aged 15-49) was much wider in the LDCs than in the DCs: at the median 
about 7 years for the former and about 3 years for the latter (line 9). 
Third, the age excess of husbands over wives in the LDCs rises markedly 
from the younger to the older ages of wives (still within the 15-49 
span)--from 5.3 at the first quartile to 9.3 at the third; whereas the 
age excess of husbands in the DCs increases only slightly--from 2.8 
at the first quartile to 3.3. at the third (line 9). 
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These conclusions are subject to two qualifications: the limited 
coverage of the LDCs and, particularly, the assumption underlying the 
"matching" of husbands and wives. It is this assumption, applied within 
the age distribution of married women, that produces the steep rise in 
exesss of age of husband for the LDCs. On the other hand, the omission 
of Sub-Saharan Africa may have resulted in understating the age excess 
of husband over wife in the LDCs. Consequently, the general order of 
magnitudes is likely to stand. To put it briefly, the age excess of 
husbands over wives is probably significantly wider in the LDCs than 
in the DCs, particularly at the older age; the average ages of husbands 
of wives aged 15-49 are not too different in the LDCs and the DCs; and 
6the wives are distinctly younger in the former than in the latter. 
The contrast in ages of wives and husbands in the LDCs and those 
in the DCs, is of interest in itself. It suggests a difference in the 
stru,cture of the household, at least as far as the parental generation 
is concerned. But it also is an indirect indication of the distribution 
of births by age of father, from which we can infer the contribution of 
older fathers to the difference in crude birth rates between the LDCs and 
the DCs. Panels C and D of Table 5 show the results of an attempt to 
link the age distributions of married men and women with the distri­
butions of births by ages of fathers and mothers. The underlying 
assumption is that births are related to married men and women, and 
illegitimate births are disregarded. However, the latter are clearly 
definable, and of some limited importance, only in the DCs. 
In Panel C we link the distribution of married women with that 
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of married mothers (unmarried mothers having been excluded by assump­
tion). For the LDCs the distribution of married women underlying the 
par~ition values shown in line 10, colunms 1-3, is from Table 2 and 
3, and includes all regions--much more complete coverage than that in 
li~e 5--which explains the slight difference between the two sets of 
par~ition values in lines 5 and 10. This minor discrepancy suggests 
that the limitation of coverage for the LDCs in Panels A and B was 
not of great consequence. Panel C indicates, as one would expect, 
that the population of current mothers is distinctly younger than the 
population of current wives, aged 15-49, reflecting the higher age 
specific birth rates for the younger age classes, particularly those 
under 35 (line 14). Also, since the concentration of childbearing 
within the prime age classes--20-34--among the married women is greater 
in the DCs than in the LDCs, and since married women are, on the 
average, older in the DCs, the lead of age partition values of mothers 
over wives is far wider in the DCs than in the LDCs--over 8 years 
compared with 3 years at the median respectively (see line 14 again). 
In Panel D we apply the differentials in the age partition 
values between wives and mothers to the estimated age partition values 
of husbands, to derive the age partition values for fathers. The 
assumption underlying this calculation is that the age excess of 
husband over wife, for a given age class of the latter, is identic-
al with that of father over mother within the given age class of wife. 
However; if, e.g., wives age 20-24 have husbands who are 25-29 (i.e. five 
years older), the current mothers among these wives (say a quarter of 
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them) may have husbands who are more or less than five year~. older. 
Unfortunately, we have no basis for adjusting the age differential 
between husband and wife to that between father and mother. In any 
case, the adjustment is not likely to be substantial. Moreover, the 
distribution of births by age of father in lines 17 and 18 will be 
checked by alternative sets of data in following tables. 
Lines 17 allows for internal "matching" whereas for line 18 
we assumed a constant excess of age of husband within the range of 
married women 15-49--an assumption somewhat less realistic than that 
used in other panels, but one that reduces the effect of the matching 
assumption. Still, the differences between the two lines are so 
slight that they suggest the same conclusion. 
The conclusion is that fathers of about 40 or over contribute 
a quarter of all births in the LDCs. Thus, in the latter, with the 
crude birth rate at 43.4 per 1,000, a component of 10.85 is to be 
credited to these fathers. In the DCs, the age partition value for 
fathers at the third quartile is below 35 years; and it seems rea­
sonable in the light of other evidence to suggest that fathers aged 
40 and over can be credited with about one-tenth of all births. With 
a crude birth rate of 20.2, the contribution of the older fathers in 
the DCs is then 2.02. The difference between the contributions of 
older fathers in the LDCs and DCs is then 10.85 minus 2.02, or 8.83, 
out of a total difference in the crude birth rates of 23.2 points, or 
well over a third. This finding differs markedly from that for mothers. 
Mothers aged 40 or more account for only 1.3 out of 23.2 points of 
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total difference; and even women aged 35 and over contribute only a 
seventh of the total difference in crude birth rates between LDCs and 
the DCs (see Table 2, line 28). 
The contribution of older fathers can be checked with an altern­
ative set of data, also incomplete, but in other ways. For eleven 
less developed countries we have for recent years distributions of 
births by age of father, which can be compared with the distributions 
by age of mother. Similar data are available for all developed countries, 
but for the 1950s, not the 1960s; and for legitimate births only. The 
evidence is summarized in Table 6. 
Regretably, we have no data for the populous Asian countries, 
like India and Pakistan, or for Sub-Saharan Africa, both regions with 
high specific birth rates in the younger age classes of women. We use 
Middle East and Latin America, weighted equally (since the structure 
of the former is closer to the missing regions), to represent the LDCs. 
This approach, while understating the excess of ages of fathers over 
those of mothers, may nevertheless yield a good approximation of the 
share of older fathers in total births. 
The share of fathers aged 40 and over in the distribution of 
births by age of fathers for the average of ME and LA, is about a 
quarter (line 11). This finding checks with that indicated bv the 
age partition values established in Table 5. By contrast, the share 
of fathers 40 or older in total births in the DCs is about 11 percent, 
which also checks with the finding based on Table 5 (line 23). 
In comparing directly the shares in total births of fathers 
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Table 6 
Distributions of Births by Age of Mother and of Father, 
Selected Groups of Countries, Late 1950s and mid 1960s 
(percentages) 
A. Distribution of Births 
Age Classes of Mothers and Fathers 
Below 20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Less Developed Countries 
Taiwan and Philippines 
1. Mothers 5.8 26.1 29.1 20.7 12.8 4.7 
2. Fathers 1.1 14.4 27.0 24.3 17.2 9.8 
3. Line 2 - line 1 -4.7 -11. 7 -2.1 3.6 4.4 5.1 
Middle East (3 countries) 
4. Mothers 8.3 21.8 26.0 21.4 14.6 6.1 
5. Fathers 0.4 7.1 19.0 22.5+ 20.0 13.5 
6. Line 5 - line 4 ~7.9 -14.7 -7.0 1.1 5.4 7.4 
Latin America (6 countries) 
7. Mothers 14 .3 29.4 24.2 16.6 11.0 3.7 
8. Fathers 2.3 18.6 24.6 21.0 15.0 9.3 
9. Line 8 - line 7 -12.0 -10.8 0.4 4.4 4.0 5.6 
10. Average of ME and LA (equal weights) 
10. Mothers 11.3 25.6 25.1 19.0 12.8 4.9 
11. Fathers 1.3 12.9 21.8 21.8 17.5 11.4 

















Table 6 continued: 
Developed Countries 
Europe (10 countries) 
13. Mothers 4.9 26.3 31.3 21.9 11.7 3.5 0.4 100 
14. Fathers 0.7 13.8 30.7 26.2 15.9 7.8 4.9 100 
15. Line 14-line 13 -4.2 -12.5 -0.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.5 34.6 
Overseas Offshoots (3 countries) 
16. Mothers 8.9 31.5 29.4 17.8 9.4 2.8 0.2 100 
17. Fathers 1.6 18.3 30.5 24.3 14.7 6.9 3.7 100 
18. Line 17-line 16 -7.3 -13.2 1.1 6.5 5.3 4.1 3.5 41.0 
JaEan 
19. Mothers 1.2 27.2 43.3 20.2 6.6 1.4 0.1 100 
20. Fathers 0 7.5 39.4 33.1 12.4 5.1 2.5 100 
21. Line 20-line 19 -1.2 -19.7 -3.9 12.9 5.8 3.7 2.4 49.6 
All DeveloEed (weighted average) 
22. Mothers 5.8 28.4 32.5 20.1 10.0 2.9 0.3 100 
23. Fathers 0.9 14.5+ 32.0 26.6 14.9 7.0 4.1 100 
24. Line 23-line 22 -4.9 -13. 9 -0.5 6.5 4.9 4.1 3.8 38.6 
B. Age Partition Values in the Distribution of Births, Mothers and Fathers 
Taiwan Middle Latin LA & Europe Ov. Japan DCs 
Philip. East Am. ME Off. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mothers 
25. 1st quartile 23.7 23.8 21.8 22.7 23.8 22.6 24.3 23.4 
26. Median 28.1 28.8 26.3 27.6 28.0 26.6 27.5 27.4 
27. 3rd quartile 33.4 34.4 32.1 33.4 32.9 31.5 30.8 32.1 
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Table 6 continued: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fathers 
28. 1st quartile 26.6 29.6 25.8 27.5 26.7 25.8 27.2 26.5 
29. Median 31.5 35.2 31.1 33.2 30.9 29.9 30.5 30.5 
30. 3rd quartile 37.4 42.2 37.8 39.9 36.1 35.1 34.2 35.3 
Excess of Age of Fathers· 
31. 1st quartile 2.9 5.8 4.0 4.8 2.9 3.2 2.9 3.1 
32. Median 3.4 6.45 4.8 5.6 2.9 3.3 3.0 3.1 
33. 3rd quartile 4.0 7.8 5.7 6.5 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.2 
Notes: 
The distributions of births by age of mothers and of fathers for identicalare 
countries for the same year. Column 8 of lines 3, 6, 9 •.• 24, is the sum of 
columns 1-7, signs disregarded. 
The data for the LDCs are largely from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 
1969 (New York, 1970), Tables 14 and 19. Taiwan is the one country for an earlier 
year, 1958, from Demographic Yearbook, 1959 (New York, 1959), Tables 11 and 13. 
Lines 1-2: Includes the Philippines (1964) and Taiwan (1958). 
Lines 4-5: Includes Algeria (1965), Tunisia (1965), and the United Arab 
Republic (1966). 
Lines 7-8: Includes Puerto Rico (1963), Peru (1963), Chile (1963), Guatemala 
(1963), and Costa Rica and Panama, combined (1963). Many Latin American countries 
also reporting had to be omitted because in the distribution by age of father, the 
unallocated births were more than twenty percent of the total. 
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Table 6 continued: 
Lines 13-14: Because of inadequate coverage of Europe in later years, we 
had to use data on legitimate births for 1957 or 1958, given in the Demographic 
Yearbook, 1959. The only country included for a recent year (total births, 1963) 
was England and Wales. 
The following countries were included: Austria (1958), Belgium (1958), Denmark 
(1957), Finland (1958), France (1958), Germany (FR, 1955), ~etherlands (1958), 
Norway (1957), Sweden (1957) and England and Wales (1963). 
Lines 16-17: Includes Canada (1958), United States (1955), and Australia (1963). 
Lines 19-20: For 1957. 
Lines 22-23: The weights used are population for 1960 (see notes to· Table 1). 
Lines 25-30: Derived by linear interpolation from the percentage distributions 
in Panel>.. 
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and mothers of identical age classes (lines 3,6, and so on of Panel A), 
or in comparing the age partition values derived from the distributions 
of births by ages of fathers and mothers, we are implicitly matching 
younger fathers and mothers. Since this plausible assumption is used 
also in connection with Table 5, we can compare the differentials in 
age-partition values between mothers and fathers, with those obtained 
in comparing wives and husbands in Table 5. There the age excess of 
husbands over wives, for the LDCs, was 5.3 years at the first quartile, 
6.9 years at the median, and 9.3 years at the third quartile; for the 
DCs it was 2.8, 2.9, 3.3 years respectively (see Table 5, line 9). In 
Table 6, the age excess of fathers over mothers, for the average of the 
Middle East and Latin America, was 4.8 years at the first quartile, 
5.6 years at the median, and 6.5 years at the third quartile; while 
the corresponding differentials for the DCs are 3.1, 3.1, 3.2 years 
(lines 31-33, columns 4 and 8). For the DCs the differentials between 
the age partition values of husbands and wives are about the same as 
between those of fathers and mothers, although the average ages of 
wives and husbands differ from those of mothers and fathers. For the 
LDCs the age excess of fathers over mothers in Table 6 is narrower 
than that of husbands over wives in Table 5, but the difference maybe 
due partially' to inadequate coverage in Table 5. Yet Table 6 confirms, 
for fathers and mothers, the finding for husbands and wives in Table 
5: the age excess of men is much wider in the LDCs than in the DCs, 
and it increases more significantly in the former as the age of wife 
or mother rises. 
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On the basis of Table 6, and the assumption that the average 
for the Middle East and Latin American represents the LDCs, we derive 
the distributions of births by the quinquennial age classes of fathers, 
as we did for mothers in Table 2. We then calculate the contributions 
of each age class to the differences in crude birth rates between the 
LDCs and DCs (Table 7). 
The finding here confirms the inference from Table 5 that the 
contribution of fathers aged 40 and over is so much greater in the 
LDCs than in the DCs that it accounts for one-third of the total dif­
ferences between the crude birth rates of the two groups of countries. 
In Table 2 we found that young mothers, those below the age of 20, 
contributed more than a fifth of the total difference between the crude 
birth rates of the LDCs and the DCs (see Table 2, line 29). Assuming 
little overlapping between husbands 40 and over and wives below the 
age of 20, one could say that if the age specific birth rates for women 
below age 20 and for men 40 or more were the same in the LDCs and the 
DCs, the difference in the crude birth rates between the two groups of 
countries would have been cut by more than half; and the crude birth 
rate for the LDCs would be somewhat over 30 per 1,000 (compared with 
about 20 for the DCs), instead of over 43 per 1,000 as shown now. 
5. Distribution of Births by Parity 
Parity refers to the birth order in the childbearing sequence 
for a given mother--first birth, second, third, and so on. It suggests 
the number of children presumed to be living when the given birth 
occurs--although this statistics could be estimated directly if data 
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Table 7 
Distribution of Births by Age of Father, Less Developed 
and Developed Market Economies, 1950s and 1960s 
Age of Mother or Father 
Below 45 & 
20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 over Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
% Shares of 
Births by Age 
of Mother (lines 1-4) 
1. Middle East 11.1 27.0 27.6 19.2 10.7 3.7 0.7 100 
2. Latin America 13.6 28.3 25.0 17.4 11.0 3.8 1.0 100 
3. ME and LA 
(equal weights) 12.4 27.6 26.3 18.3 10.8 3.7 0.9 100 
4. LDCs 14.6 28.1 25.6 17.1 10.0 3.6 1.0 100 
5. Differences in % 
shares of births, 
age of father minus 
age of mother, 
ME and LA -10.0 -12.7 -3.3 2.8 4.7 6.5 i2.0 0 
6. Derived% shares of 
births by age of 
father (line 4 + 
line 5) 4.6 15.4 22.3 19.9 14.7 10.1 13.0 100 
7. % shares of births 
by age of mother, DCs 7.2 30.0 31.6 19.1 9.5 2.4 0.2 100 
8. Differences in% 
shares of births, 
age of father minus 
age of mother, DCs -4.9 -13. 9 -0.5 6.5 4.9 4.1 3.9 0 
9. Derived% shares of 
births by age of 
father, DCs (line 7 
plus line 8) 2.3 16.1 31.1 25.6 14.4 6.5 4.0 100 
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Table 7 continued: 
Age Classes 
Below
20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45+ Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Contributions to Differences in Crude Birth Rates, Age Classes of Fathers 
10. LDCs 2.0 6.7 9.7 8.6 6.4 4.4 5.6 43.4 
11. DCs 0.5 3.2 6.3 5.2 2.9 1.3 0.8 20.2 
12. Contributions
to differences 1.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.1 4.8 23.2 
13. % Distribution
c£. Line 12 7 15 15 15 15 13 20 100 
Notes: 
Lines 1, 2, and 4: Calculated from Table 2, lines 11, 13, and 14. 
Line 5: From Table 5, line 12. 
Line 7: From Table 2, line 18. 
Line 8: From Table 5, line 24. 
Lines 10-13: Shares in lines 6 and 9 applied to total crude birth rates 
for the LDCs (43.4 per 1,000) and the DCs (20.2). See also Table 2, Panel C. 
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were available on numbers of surviving children cross-classified with 
the occurrence of the next birth. Parity data also shed some light on 
the age of parents, sin~e, obviou5ly, high parities, i.e. high orders 
of birth, are connected with advanced ages of mother and, part~cularly, 
of father. The two connections--between parity and older siblings, 
and between parity and age of parents--set the lines for the discus­
sion here of the summary data. 
In Table 8 we show the distribution of births by birth order 
for the LDCs and the DCs. The coverage for the LDCs omits Sub-Saharan 
Africa for which the data are not available,and is quite limited for 
other regions. But for the three subregions shown, the distributions 
are quite similar: the share of the high parity births (i.e. the fifth 
and higher order) is 37 percent of ESE Asia, 33 percent for the Middle 
East, and 35 percent for Latin America. There is somewhat greater var­
iation among the developed countries: the share of the s~ne high parities 
is less than 10 percent for Europe, only 2 percent for Japan, and 16 
percent for the overseas countries. But each of these, and their 
average, about 11 percent, are distinctly below the shares of high 
parities for the LDCs. This finding is not surprising since we found 
in Table l that complete fertility averaged about 6 children for the 
LDCs and less than 3 children for the DCs--and thus clearly implied 




Distribution of Births by Birth Order, Less Developed 
and Developed Market Economies, Early 1960s 
Number Shares of Births in Increasing Order {Parity2 
of 
Countries 1 2 3 4 5 6&7 8+ Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Less Developed 
1. ESE Asia 4 18.4 16.9 14.9 13.0 10.9 14.9 11.0 100 
2. Middle East 2 17.2 19.7 16.1 13.9 11.0 14.0 8.1 100 
3. Latin America 12 21.6 16.7 14.5 12.0 9.6 13.2 12.4 100 
4. Total LDCs, 
weighted 18.8 17.1 15.0 12.9 10.7 14.6 10.9 100 
Developed 
5. Europe 13 36.5 29.4 16.4 8.3 4.2 3.5 1. 7 100 
6. Overseas offshoots 4 28.9 24.8 18.5- 11.7 6.6 6.0 3.5 100 
7. Japan 1 47.5 35.7 11.8 3.0 1.1 0.7 0.2 100 
8. Total DCs, 
weighted 35.4 28. 7 16.5- 8.7 4.6 4.0 2.1 100 
Contributions to Crude Birth Rates 
9. LDCs 8.2 7.4 6.5 5.6 4.7 6.3 4.7 43.4 
10. DCs 7.2 5.8 3.3 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.4 20.2 
11. Line 9 minus 
line 10 1.0 1.6 3.2 3.9 3.8 5.4 4.3 23.2 
12. !IDistribution of 
line 11 4 7 14 17 16 23 19 100 
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Table 8 continued: 
Notes: 
Lines 1-3 and 5-7: The underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic 
Yearbook, 1969 (New York 1970), Table 17, supplemented for one or two countries by 
the Demographic Yearbook, 1965 (New York 1966), Table 16. 
The data refer primarily to 1963, but another year was taken if data for 1963 
were missing or their coverage was incomplete. No adequate data were available for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Percentages were taken to totals excluding the unallocated, except for Mexico 
where the uµallocated were combined in the source with the top parity group (but the 
effect on column 8 is negligible). For Sweden,the shares of the two top parity groups 
had to be estimated from the averages for the other twelve countries in the region. 
Line 1: Includes Pakistan, West Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. The data 
for India, relating to a limited sample of urban communities, could not be used~ there­
fore, we took an unweighted mean of entries for the four countries. 
Line 2: Includes Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. 
Line 3: Includes Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
Lines 4 and 8: The weighting was the same as that in Tables 1 and 2. 
Lines 5-6: The coverage is the same as that in Table 1. 
Lines 9-10: The percentage shares in lines 4 and 8 were applied to the crude 
birth rates for the LDCs and DCs (43.4 and 20.2 respectively, see Table 2). 
Lines 11-12: Calculated similarly to lines 28-29 of Table 2. 
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Nor is it surprising that the high parity births account for 
much of the excess of the crude birth rate in the LDCs over that in 
the DCs. Births of the fifth and higher orders contribute c)_ose to 
six-tenths of the total difference in the crude birth rates between 
the LDCs and the DCs (line 12). Thus, if the proportions of high 
parity births to total population were the same for the LDCs as for 
the DCs the crude birth rates would differ by only four-tenths, i.e. 
would be somewhat below 30 per 1,000 in the LDG>, instead of the 43. 4 
per 1,000 for the late 1960s. 
But we are more concerned here with the connection between 
births of high parity and the presumed number of older surviving 
siblings. For the latter we require data on mortality for the younger 
ages, which are even scarcer for the LDCs than those on births by parity. 
But we can approximate the necessary coefficients for Latin America, 
the only subregion among the LDCs for which the coverage in Table 8 is 
adequate. 
Estimates of survival of children to age 5 are available for a 
. Am. . 7 number ofLatin erican countries. For 1955-59 (the latest quinquen-
nium shown), the number of survivors at age 5 (from an initial cohort 
of 1,000) varies from a high of 929 for Argentina to a low of 787 for 
Guatemala. The arithmetic mean number of survivors for 11 countries 
(excluding Argentina, but comprising Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela) is 849. But we also need estimates of survivors to ages 
from 10 to 20. We know from the standard sources that age specific 
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death rates between age 5 and the late teens are extremely low. We 
have, therefore, assumed relevant survivor estimate to high parity ages 
of 800 to 825 for Latin America or a cumulative mortality of 175 to 200 
per 1,000. For the DCs we have assumed 925 to 940 survivors, or a 
cumulative mortality of 60 to 75 per 1,000 (a sizable error in this 
estimate will have little effect on our comparison). 
The comparison of the birth parity grouping for Latin America, 
with that for·a11 the DCs is given in the following tabulation. 
Contribution to CBR, Contribution to CBR 
Low Parities (1-4) High Parities, 5+ 
Total Survival Adj- Total Survival Adj-
rate usted rate usted 
(1) (2) (1+2) (4) (5) (4+5) 
l. Latin America 28.7 0.825 
(3) 
23.68 15.6 0.80 
(6) 
12.48 
2. DCs 18.0 0.940 16.92 2.2 0.925 2.04 
3. Excess, 
LA over DCS 10.7 6.76 13.4 10.44 
Note: The contribution for Latin America was calculated by multiplying 
the shares of parity groups in total births (line 3, Table 8) by the 
total crude birth rate of 44.3 per 1,000 (for the latter see Table 2, 
line 13). 
The rough comparison shows that by the time the average mother 
in Latin America gives birth to her fifth child, she must have over 
three surviving children. Moreover, the contribution even of mothers 
with birth parity below 5, in terms of surviving children, 23.7 per 
1,000, exceeds not only the total surviving birth rate (18.96) but 
also the total crude birth rate (20.2) for the DCs. Yet the con-
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tributions to the crude birth rate in Latin America continued beyond 
the fourth birth order--with the survivors of these high bi1'ths exceed­
ing those in the DCs by over 10 points and accounting for about six­
tenths of the total difference in the proportion of surviving births (to 
about age 20) between Latin America and the DCs. In short, in the LDCs, 
the high fertility and high birth parities persist despite the substantial 
number of surviving children within the families that continue to grow. 
The mortality rates may be somewhat higher in the other LDC regions 
than in Latin America, but the conclusion is likely to stand. 
We turn now to the connection between high parities and the 
advanced age of parents. The relevant data provide cross-classifications 
of births by parity and age of mother alone, and for only a few countries, 
particularly among the less developed. Hence we present the data for a 
few individual countries, and do not attempt to derive meaningful 
averages (Table 9)°. However, the general order of magnitudes suggested 
would probably be confirmed by more abundant data if they were available. 
Needless to say, the role of the older mothers in high parity 
births in substantial. Thus the average for the five selected less 
developed countries shows that of 31.5 percent, the share of high 
parity births in the total, over four-tenths was contributed by mothers 
35 years of age or older. Interestingly, in the DCs also, the contri­
bution of mothers that old to the high parity births was also about 
fo~r-tenths, although the latter accounted for only about 10 percent 
of total births. Given the excess in the age of father over mother, 
discussed in the preceding section, we may assume that mothers 35 
years old or more are to be matched with fathers well over 40; and 
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Table 9 
Shares in Total Births of High Parity Births to Older Mothers, 
Selected LDCs and DCs; and Contribution to Differences 
in Birth Rates, Selected Countries 












6. Lines 1-5 
Developed 
7. France, 1963 
8. Germany, FR. 
1964 
9. USA, 1964 
10. Japan, 1963 
11. Average 
Lines 7-10 
Births (5th and over) to Older Mothers (%) 
Age of Mothers 
30-34 35-39 40 and over 30 and over All ages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10. 7 9.0 3. 7 23.4 35.4 
11.0 10. 3 5. 5 21. 8 32. 9 
7. 2 9.4 5. 7 22. 3 25. 9 
10.3 8. 5 3. 8 22. 6 33. 1 
11. 0 9. 6 3. 9 24.5 30. 3 
10.0 9. 4 4. 5 23.9 31. 5 
7. 0 4. 4 1.9 13. 3 14. 2 
2. 3 2. 1 1. 1 5. 5 6. 6 
5. 7 4. 0 1.3 11. 0 17. 4 
o. 7 o. 8 o. 3 1.8 2. 4 
3. 9 2. 8 1. 2 7. 9 10.15 
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Table 9 continued: 
Bo Contribution to Differences in Birth Rates 
Shares of High Contributions to 
Parity Births (%) CBR 
Mothers, Mothers, Mothers, Mothers, 
Aged 30+ Aged 35+ Aged 30+ Aged 35+ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
12. LDCs 25. 7 15. 9 11. 2 6.90 
13. DCs 8. 2 4. 2 1. 7 0.85-
Notes 
Panel A: The data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1969, 
(New York, 1970), Table 17. We chose the major countries in the regions for 
which data were available, to secure a rough approximation. Because of the 
limited coverage of the less developed regions, other than Latin America, even 
inclusion of all reporting countries could not yield adequate representation. 
Panel B, columns 1 and 2: First we derived the ratios of the shares of 
high parity births for the older mothers to the shares of high parity births for 
mothers of all ages (i.e. the ratio of column 4 to column 5, in lines 6 and 10 
for column 1 or of the sums of columns 2 and 3 to column 5 in lines 6 and 10, 
for column 2). These worked out too. 71 and 0.44 for the LDCs and O. 77 and 0.39 
for the DCs. We then applied these to the total shares of higher parities in 
Table 7 (i.e. 36.2 percent for LDCs and 10. 7 percent for the DCs), to secure 
the entries in lines 12 and 13. 
Panel B, columns 3 and 4: The shares in column 1-2 were multiplied by 
the total CBR for the LDCs (43.4) and for the DCs (20.2) respectively. The 
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Table 9 continued: 
calculation thus parallels that in Panel C of Table 2, except that here it is 
limited to a comparison of higher parity births to older mothers, not to all 
births to all mothers. 
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mothers 30 years old or more imply fathers 35 or more. 
Panel B of Table 9 provides an illustrative calculation of the 
contribution of high parity births to older parents to the total dif­
ferential (23.2 points) in the crude birth rates between the LDes and 
Des. The high parity births to mothers aged 35 or more (and implicit­
ly to fathers well over 40) account for over 6 points, or over a 
quarter of the total difference in the eBRs between the LDCs and the 
Des. The high parity births to mothers aged 30 and over (and implicit­
ly to fathers 35 and older) account for 9.5 points, or almost half of 
the differential in the crude birth rates. 
We have emprasized the large contribution of high parities, 
associated with sizable numbers of surviving siblings and with the 
advanced age of parents, to the excess of crude birth rates in the 
LDes over the Des. The reason for this is that these findings must hP 
recognized in dealing with the persistence of the high birth rates in the LDCs, 
We must, in analysing the latter, explain not only the connection between the 
higher fertility and the earlier marriage and younger parents; i.e. 
at the low parities, but also the relation of high parities to older 
parents. Why does a family with a mother whose fecundity is declining, 
and with the father who approaches or passes beyond the age of forty, 
continue to have high parity births? Why do such families contribute 
between a quarter and a half of the total birth rate differential 
between the LDes and the DCs? 
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6. Distribution by Size of Household 
The family, a group related by blood-ties and usually residing 
together, is the unit in society primarily responsible for rearing 
children to the age of maturity, when they can leave the p,3.rental 
home and assume the responsibilities of adult life. Given the higher 
fertility, predominantly intra-marital, in the LDCs, the average 
family should be larger in these countries than in the DCs, if only 
because more surviving children are brought up within the family fold. 
But the family is a complex concept that does not lend itself 
easily to statistical observation; in the larger meaning, relevant to 
pooling of economic assets and income for coverage of consumer ex­
penditures and accumulation, a family should include not only the 
nuclear unit of parents and their children residing together but also 
others. The available statistics do not refer to the family but to 
the household--a group of individuals sharing quarters (including 
single-person households) "who make common provision for food and 
other essentials of living. The persons in the group may pool their 
incomes and have a common budget to a greater or lesser extent; they 
8 may be related or unrelated persons, or a combination of both. " A 
household can then be wider than a family, since it may include 
members not related by blood-ties, or narrower since it may exclude 
closely related members living elsewhere. Still, it is a fairly 
useful approximation to what may be called the co-habiting family 
unit, in that households with members not related by blood-ties 
(e.g. domestic servants, hired workers for a family business, boarders, 
and the like) constitute limited proportions of all households. 
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Being largely family households, they are relevant to tracing the 
effects of differential fertility on the number of children within 
the unit. More important for our purpose--consideration of the 
possible effects of numbers of children on the economic position of 
the closely relevant family unit--the household is the unit most often 
employed in studies of the distribution of income by size. 
Table 10 summarizes the data on distribution of ,households and 
population by size of household, with emphasis on comparison between 
the LDCs and DCs. The difficulties with the definition of a house­
hold, particularly in cases of unrelated individuals living communally 
in lodging houses, dormitories, and the like--in addition to those 
.involved in establishing fully the sharing of quarters by a family 
household with non-related members--yield statistical divergences 
from the true situation (illustrations can be found in the source in 
footnote 8). In Table 10 these difficulties appear to affect parti­
cularly the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa, which suffers also from 
inadequate country coverage. For these reasons, we excluded.Sub­
Saharan Africa from the averages for all LDCs--although the broad 
differences between the LDCs and the DCs would not have been much 
affected by its inclusion. 
The larger size of household, and particularly the larger 
proportion of households and population in the larger units in the 
LDCs than in the DCs,is clear. Households of seven persons or more 
are 28 percent of all households in the LDCs (line 5) and they 
account for close to a half of total population (line 14), whereas 
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Distribution of Households and PopulationTable 10 
by Size of Household, LDCs and DCs, 
Early and Late 1960s (percentages) 
Size of Household Groups 
1 2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9+ 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Distribution of Households 
1. ESE Asia 5.7 8.8 29.7 28.2 17.8 9.8 
(8) 
2. Middle East 
(9) 6.0 10.8 28.6 29.3 15.7 9.6 
3. Sub~aharan Afr. 
(8) 11.4 48.1 20.1 20.4 
4. Latin America 
(15) 7.4 10.5 27.1 24.9 16.5 13.6 
5. LDCs (ex. line 
3) 6.0 9.3 29.1 27.8 17.4 10.4 
6. Europe (13) 16.9 26.1 37.9 14.5 4.6 
7. Overseas offshoots 
(4) 10.9 24.7 37.1 19.8 7.5 
.8. Japan (1970) 13.1 15.0 44.0 22.3 5.6 
9. DCs 14.0 23.8 38.6 17.8 5.8 
B. Distribution of Population (Same Countries as in Panel A) 
10. ESE Asia 1.1 3.6 20.6 29.7 25.6 19.4 
11. Middle East 1.2 4.2 19.7 31.4 23.9 19.6 
12. Sub-Saharan Afr. 2.7 
31. 7 24.2 41.4 
13. Latin America 1.5 4.1 19.0 26.0 23.0 26.4 
14. LDCs (ex. line 12) 1.2 3.7 20.3 29.3 25.0 20.5 
15. Eurppe 5.4 16.8 41.9 24.4 11.5 
16. Overseas offshoots 3.1 13.9 36.5 29.7 16.8 
17. Japan 3.6 8.3 43.4 33.1 11.6 




The major source is the United Nations, Methods of Projecting House­
holds and Families, Manual VIII in the series of annuals on methods of es­
timating population (New York, 1973), Table 3, pp. 12-15, which distinguishes 
the following size classes of households: 1, 2-4, 5-6, 7 and over. To 
obtain greater detail, we used data from somewhat fewer countries for each 
region (except Sub-Saharan Africa) taken from the Demographic Yearbooks 
(particularly those for 1962 and 1963, and 1971), from these we derived al­
location ratios for the 2-4 and 7+ groups; and applied them to the total 
shares for these two size groups. 
Lines 1 and 8: Include Cambodia, Ceylon, South Korea, Federation of 
Malaya, Philippines, Thailand, India (allocated with the wider size groups 
by ratios for Ceylon), and Pakistan. The usual weighting was employed for 
this region. 
Lines 2 and 9: Include Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Libya, 
Tunisia, Morocco, and the UAR. 
Lines 3 and 10: · Include several smaller countries for better coverage: 
Lesotho, Dahomey, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Zambia. 
Cameroon was excluded because of the exceptional showing for the 1-person 
group. 
Lines 4 and 11: Include Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. 
Lines 6-8 and 15-17: Coverage is as complete as in Table 1. We took the 
1970 data for Japan (rather than those for earlier years) to give greater weight 
to the recent experience (with the rapid changes in Japan's birth rate and 
family structure). 
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the corresponding proportions in the DCs are less than 6 and less than 
14 percent respectively (lines 9 and 18). By contrast, one person 
households in the LDCs are only 6 percent of the total and they account 
for about 1 percent of total population, while the corresponding pro­
portions for the DCs are 14 and 4 percent respectively. 
The arithmetic mean size of household is clearly greater in the 
LDCs than in the DCs. This mean is easily calculated by dividing the 
percentage shares of one person households in the total of households 
by the share of one-person households in total population (or, 
with the necessary adjustment, by relating the proportions of two­
person households in households and in population). The resultant 
averages are 5.0 persons per household in the LDCs and 3.33 persons 
per household in the DCs. This difference, while substantial, may 
appear to be too narrow, considering that total fertility in the LDCs 
is over twice as high as that in the DCs (see Table 1). However, the 
average size of household is a weighted arithmetic mean, in which the 
younger (and smaller) households have a greater weight in the LDCs 
than in the DCs (see Table 2 for relative weights of women in the suc­
cessive age groups within the childbearing span). If we use the 
.weights in Table 2 for women aged 15 to 49 and assume that the size 
of household corresponding to these ages, grows in the LDCs from 3 
for the 15-19 age group of women by one person for each successive 
quninquennium reaching 9 persons in the age group 45-49, the weighted 
avBrage size of household works out to somewhat over 5.5. The addition 
of single-person households (6 percent of households, but only 1,2 
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percent of population) would reduce the arithmetic mean to 5.3; and 
if we reasonably assume that households with women aged 50 years and 
over are, on the whole, smaller, the avergge of 5.0 obtained from 
Table 10 is consistent with the assumption that during the childbearing 
cycle the average woman in the LDCs may have over 7 births (accounting 
for the top size of 9 persons). A similar calculation for the DCs, 
using a progression in size of household from 2 persons for women 
15-19 years old, to 3 for the 20-24 age bracket, to 4 for the 25-29 
age bracket, and to 4.5 for the remaining age brackets through 45-49, 
would yield a weighted arithmetic mean of 3.8, which with inclusion of 
one person households (14 percent of households and 4.2 percent of 
population), would be reduced to 3.4--and be consistent with the 3.33 
mean derived from Table 10, with allowance for the remaining house­
holds with women aged 50 years and over. The consistency then is 
with the assumption that women in the DCs bear 2.5 children (or 
somewhat more)--less than half of the number assumed in the calcula­
tion for the LDCs. 
The interest in the conjectural calculations just presented is 
less in the consistency between the difference in mean size of house­
holds in the LDCs and the DCs and the difference in their fertility, 
than in the emphasis on the fact that the range in the size of households 
within each group of countries is a reflection of the stages in the 
life cycle of a family. A new family begins with two members, grows 
as children are born and have to be maintained within the family for 
a prolonged period to maturity; then contracts as the parents and 
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children grow older and the children leave to form a new and separate 
household. The average size of the household is a somewhat artifical 
measure that is a weighted combination of units of widely divergent 
magnitudes. It must therefore be remembered that differences in size 
of household reflect, in large part, differences in the stage in the 
life cycle of growth and contraction of the various family units. 
Two further observations are relevant to the findings in Table 
J
10. First, it can be demonstrated that much of the difference between 
the 5.0 person average household in the LDCs and the 3.33 person 
average household in the DCs is due to the different proportions of 
children in total population. In 1960 in the LDCs (excluding Sub­
Saharan Af~ica) the proportion of children under 15 to total popula-
tion was 42.8 percent; of persons under 20 years of age--52.5 percent. 
9 
The similar proportions for the DCs (Western and Northern Europe and 
Italy, North America, Australia and New Zealand and Japan) were 27.8 
and 33.3 percent respectively. If we apply these percentages to the 
mean size of household we find that of the total discrepancy of 1.67 
persons, children under 15 accounted for 1.22 persons (or over three 
quarters of the difference) and those under 20 years of age accounted 
for 1.44 persons (or 86 percent of the difference). The calculation 
implies, realistically, that few children under 15 or persons under 
20 live outside the family unit. 
The second observation involves data relating size of household 
and income per person; and is associated with the finding (still to 
be tested) that if we group households by size, and then divide house-
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hold income by number of persons, per person income declines fairly 
consistently as we move up the scale in size of household. 10 If this 
negative association, however mitigated by reduction of nu:nber of 
persons to equivalent consuming units, is accepted, the significantly 
wider range in size of households in the LDCs than in the DCs is of 
further interest. Thus if we assume that the smaller the household, 
the higher the per person income, and array population in descending order 
of per person income, using the data in Table 10 for all LDCs and DCs, 
we can interpolate the shares of the top 20 and lowest 50 percent of 
population. We find that the average size of households for these 
two partition groups are 2.17 and 7.90 in the LDCs, and 1.70 and 5.38 
for the DCs--the ratios being 3.64 and 3.15, respectively. Again, 
if the relation between per person income and size of household 
is negative, the figures suggest that per person income differentials due 
to differences in size of household tend to be greater in the LDCs 
than in the DCs. 
Of course, the relation just suggested may not be that simple; 
and the function connecting size of household and income per person 
may not be the same for the LDCs and the DCs. But we make the 
observation here to point up the line of connection between higher 
fertility in the LDCs, larger average household, wider range of size 
of household, and hence possible greater effects on differences in 
per person income associated with households of differing size. Thus, 
the higher levels of fertility in the LDCs may affect not only 
over-all levels and growth rates in per capital product, compared 
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with the DCs, but also the internal distribution of income by size 
within the LDCs, compared with the DCs, associated with the wider 
differentials in size of household in the former. 
This last observation is also relevant to much of the writing 
on size distribution of income in recent years. It is almost entirely 
based on data on household income, with some information on size of 
household, but with classifications of households by per household 
rather than per person (or per consuming unit) income. Needless to 
say, cross-section differences in distributions of households by size, 
and changes in these distributions over time, would affect these 
customary measures; and the latter alone could easily be misleading 
if we are concerned with income per person (or per consuming unit) 
rather than with income per household. One should also note that the 
emphasis on effects of fertility on size of household during the suc­
cessive phases of the life-cycle of the household only strengthens the 
conviction that adequate analysis of income inequalities within a 
country must take account of the demographic components that affect 
the size of household, and determine the life cycle a household-­
with its parameters different for the LDCs and the DCs, and its 
possible changes over time within each. 
7. Concluding Comments 
In concluding this paper, it may be useful to list the findings 
bearing on the demographic corollaries of the much higher birth rates 
(over 43 per 1,000) in the less developed market economies (LDCs), 
compared with those (about 20 per 1,000) in the developed (DCs). 
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These findings are based largely on international comparisons for 
the 1960s. 
(a) The age-specific fertility rates for women are, for each 
age group within the childbearing span, consistently and significantly 
higher in the LDCs than in the DCs. Women in the LDCs begin bearing 
children at earlier ages, and continue to bear them through later 
ages, than women in the DCs •. Also, the proportions of younger women 
within the childbearing span is somewhat higher in the LDCs than in 
the DCs--a factor only partly offset by the lower proportion of all 
women of childbearing ages within the total population of the LDCs. 
The higher fertility of the very young women (under 20 years of age) 
and of the older women (35 years or more) in the LDCs accounts for 
almost four-tenths of the total difference in the crude birth rates 
between the two groups of countries. 
(b) The higher age specific fertility rates of women below 
age 25 in the LDCs is associated with a significantly higher 
p1"0portion married in these young age classes--both as compared 
with the DCs. Indeed, intra-marital fertility rates for women 
15-24 are somewhat lower for the LDCs than for the DCs. The early 
marriages of women in some of the major LDC regions (particularly the 
populous countries in Asia, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the 
Communist) suggest a direct transition of a young woman from the 
parental household to the household of her husband. In the DCs, on 
the other hand, young women spend several years on education and 
work outside the parental household before marriage. 
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(c) The differential in the age of married men in the LDCs 
and the DCs is far narrower. This is true both at time of marriage 
and within the married state. The bridegroom or husband is between 
5 and 8 or 9 years older than the bride or wife in the LDCs, as 
compared with 2 to 3 years older in the DCs. The composition of the 
parental couple (even setting aside some incidence of polygamy in 
the LDCs), with regard to the disparity in age and experience between 
husband and wife, is clearly different in the LDCs from that in the 
DCs--with implications for decisions concerning births and children. 
(d) Given the extension of childbearing to the more advanced ages 
of women, and the substantial age excess of husbands over wives in the 
LDCs, it follows that older fathers account for a larger proportion of 
births in the LDCs than in the DCs. The estimates suggest that fathers 
40 years or older account for almost a quarter of all births in the LDCs, 
but for only about a tenth in the DCs; and that a third of the total excess 
of crude birth rates of the LDCs over thereof the DCs is due to births 
associated with older fathers. Thus, much of the difference in birth 
rates between the two groups of countries is due to higher fertility 
of younger women and to the excess of births associated with older men 
in the LDCs, the greater motherhood of younger women,and the greater 
fatherhood of older men. 
(e) The higher parity births (fifth or higher order) account 
for almost four~tenths of all births in the LDCs, for less than one­
tenth in the DCs. This difference in the contribution of higher 
parity births accounts for almost six-tenths of the total difference 
in crude birth rates between the LDCs and the DCs; and a substantial 
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proportion is due to high parity births to older parents (women 35 
years or older; men 40 years or older). Thus much of the higher 
fertility in the LDCs is due to high parity births, incurred despite 
the presence within the household of well over three children, on the 
average, and despite the more advanced age of parents, particularly 
the father. 
(f) Given the larger number of children within the household 
in the LDCs--and they can be only within the family household one of 
whose main functions is to raise children to maturity and independence-­
one would expect that in the LDCs the average household would be sub• 
stantially larger and the proportion of the total population within fairly 
large households much greater. And, indeed, the household in the LDCs 
averages about 5 persons, compared with 3.3 in the DCs; and the pro­
portion of population in households of 7 or more persons is close to 
one-half of the total population in the LDCs, and less than a seventh 
in the DCs. These results, which are consistent with the assumption 
that fertility rates in the LDCs are over twice as high as those in 
the DCs, raise intriguing questions concerning the impact of dif-
ferences in size of households on the measures of inequality in the 
size distribution of income among households or among persons. 
Before we turn to the possible implications of these demo­
graphic corollaries of birth rates for the factors that might explain 
the persistence of the high birth rates in the LDCs, one other finding, 
not explicitly considered so far, ought to be noted. The high fertility 
rates in the LDCs observed for the 1960s and persisting into the early 
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1970s, have been maintained despite the fact that in most of the 
less developed regions, death rates, in general, and infant mortality 
rates, in particular, have declined substantially over the last three 
to four decades. Given the assumption that the desired number of 
children was limited and below total capacity, fewer births should have heen 
needed to achieve a limited total surviving children target. Also, 
in many of these regions other processes of modernization have spread, 
either since the 1920s or 1930s, or at least since shortly after World 
War II. Such modernization should have brought about a modernization 
of the demographic patterns, particularly lower birth rates and smaller 
family units. 
It would take us too far afield to document this observation 
in detail. ~ut in view of the relevance of the death rates, and their 
sharp decline in recent decades in the LDCs, we present a brief summary 
of the worldwide data easily available, and we supplement it with data 
for individual countries in Latin America, a less developed region the 
records for which are relatively good, and the political independence 
of which goes back a century and a half so that recent decades are not 
disturbed by major political changes like those that have affected 
most other less developed countries World War II (Table 11). 
We eliminated Mainland China from the aggregates for the LDCs 
because it is difficult to establish the basis of the China estimates 
for recent years. Three findings can be briefly stated. First, for all 
LDCs except China with the sharp decline in the crude death rates of 
almost a half (from 30.8 to 16.4),the crude birth rate rose slightly. 
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Table 11 
Trends in Brith Rates and Death Rates, 
Less Developed Regions and Countries 
A. Crude Vital Rates (per 1,000), LDCs and DCs, About 1937 and 1965-70 
DCs LDCs China Other LDGs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
About 1937 
1. Birth rates 24.1 42.5 42.5 42.5 
2. Death rates 15.5 31.6 32.5 30.8 
3. Infant mortal-
ity rates 106 230 na na 
1965-70 
4. Birth rates 18.6 40.6 33.1 44.0 
5. Death rates 9.1 16.1 15.3 16.4 
6. Infant mortal­
ity rates 27 140 na na 
Change, 1937 to 1965-70 
7. Birth rates -5.5 -1.9 -9.4 1.5 
8. Death rates -6.4 -15.5 -17.2 -14.4 
9. Infant mortal-
ity rates -79 -90 na na 
B. Vital Rates (per 1 1000) 1 10 Countries in Latin America, 1920-29 (I) and 
1950-59 (II) 
Cumulative death Crude Crude Standardized
rates to age 5 death rates birth rates birth rates 
I II I II I II I II 
10. Chile 338.0 145.0 28.85 13.10 43.0 37.3 40.65 37.15
11. Colombia 256.5 192.5 23.05 17.20 44.75 44.55 42.6 44.8
12. Costa Rica 184.5 115.5 23.4 9.9 45.55 45.15 46.0 47.45
13. Ecuador 295.0 197.5 28.55 16.65 48.4 na46.45 na
14. El Salvador 340.5 197.5 33.45 18.85 46.85 47.9 44.6* 48.35
15. Guatemala 278.5 224.0 33.15 21. 7 48.75 49.95 na na
16. Honduras 210.0 131.5 23.1 13.7 44.2 46.0 43.6* 49.2 
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Table 11: continued 
Panel B: concluded 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
17. Mexico 291.0 147.0 27.55 13.05 44.8 45.4 40.45 47.6 
18. Panama 172.5 88.0 16.95 9.1 39.5 39.5 37. 7* 42.1 
19. Venezuela 242.5 121.0 25.3 11.55 42.15 44.25 na na 
f 
Averages (Unweighted Arithmetic Means) 
20. 7 countries 
(except lines 
13, 15 & 19) 256.0 145.3 25.3 13.7 44.1 43.7 42.2 45.2 
21. All 10 
countries 260.8 156.0 26.4 14.6 44.8 44.6 na na 
c. Crude Vital Rates, Latin America (ex. Temperate Zone), 1950-55 to 1965-70 
Death Rates Birth Rates 
1950- 1955- 1960- 1965- 1950- 1955- 1960- 1965-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1955 1960 1965 1970 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
22. Carib-
bean 15 13 12 11 38 38 37 35 
23. Middle 
America 16 13 11 10 46 45 44 43 
24. Tropical 
South 
America 15 13 11 10 45 43 40 39 
25. Total 
weighted 15.2 13.1 11.1 10.0 44.4 42.9 40.7 39.5 
na--not available 
*-- the standard birth rate was calculated from the crude for 1920-29, using 
ratios of crude to standardized for 1930-39 or 1925-29. 
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Table 11: continued 
Notes 
Lines 1-2: Data from United Nations, World Population Trend~ ~0-194-7 
New York, December 194-9), Table 2, p. 10. We took the mid-value of the range 
shown. DCs here comprise North America, Japan, Europe, and Oceania (but exclude 
Temperate South America, a minor omission here and minor inclusion under the LDCs 
as compared with line 3 or lines 4--6). All other countries are included in the 
LDCs. China is identified with the region in the source designated "Remaining 
Far-East 0 {after exclusion of Japan). The population weights used to combine 
the rates are from Table 1, p. 3 of the source. 
Lines 3 and 6: From the UN Background paper prepared for the 1974-
World Population Conference, entitled Demographic Trends in the World and Its 
Major Regions, 1950-1970 (New York, April 16, 1974-), Table 6, p. 15. 
Lines 4- and 5: From United Nations, The World Population Situation 
in 1970 (New York, 1971), Table 11, p. 18 (birth rates), Table 12, p. 32 
(death rates), and Table 15, p. 4-6 (population totals, used as weights in 
distinguishing between China and other LDCs). 
Lines 10 to 21: Calculated from the successive country tables in 
0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates of Historical 
Trends and Fluctuations, no. 7 in Research Series of Institute of Inter­
national Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1965. The source shows 
quinquennial averages, which we converted to initial and terminal decadal 
averages. The standardization of birth rates in columns 7 and 8 is for the 
ages of women within the child-bearing span (see pp. 42-47 of source for the 
weighting). 
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Table 11: continued 
Lines 22 to 25: Calculated from the source cited for lines 3 and 6 
above. The death rates arP. derived by subtracting rates of natural increase 
(Table 7, p. 17) from birth rates (Table 5, p. 13). The weighting in line 
25 is by population in 1950 for the first quinquennium, average of 1950 and 
1960 for the second quinquennium; 1960 population for the third; and the 
average of 1960 and 1970 for the fourth quinquennium. The population totals 
are given in Table 2, p. 2, of the source. 
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Infant mortality also declined, perhaps as much as four-tenths. Second, 
for the ten Latin American countries in Panel B, both the cumulative 
death rates to age 5 and crude death rates for total population declined 
sharply from 1920-29 to 1950-59 (and could be shown to have declined more 
from 1920-24 to 1954-59)--the average decline in the former being about 
four-tenths and that in the latter somewhat greater proportionately (lines 
20 and 21, columns 1-4). Over the same period, crude birth rates barely 
changed; and when standardized for age structure of women within child­
bearing ages actually rose (line 20-21, columns 5-8). Finally Panel 
C shows that the decline in the death rates in Latin America continued 
in the recent two decades, and the crude birth rates too began to 
decline, but s1owly. In fact, the total absolute drop in birth rates 
over the last 15 years was somewhat less than that in death rates 
(leading to a slight rise in the rate of natural increase). For many 
of the populous less developed countries in Asia and North Africa (less 
so for Sub-Saharan Africa) similar rapidly declining death rates and 
constant or slightly rising birth rates could be found--although for 
a somewhat shorter period than that covered for Latin America. 
There have been other important modernization trends in the 
LDCs over the recent decades when the high birth rates persisted. 
We cite the evidence for Latin America to illustrate rather than claim 
thorough confirmation. The proportion of population in "ur•ban ag1:-­
glomerations"--urban communities larger than small towns of up to 20,000 
inhabitants--in the three subregions of Latin America (excluding the 
Temperate Zone) rose from 10.8 percent in 1920, to 20,9 percent in 
• 111950, and to 29.2 percent in 1960. This trend must have continued 
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through the 1960s. With urban defined differently (and using the 
national definitions) the percentage of urban to total population 
12for all of Latin America rose from 40.9 in 1950 to 56.7 in 1970. 
Also, per capita gross domestic product (in constant prices) must 
have been risingatasignificant rate since the mid-1920s. Approxim­
ate estimates indicate an average rise between 1925 and 1950 of about 
1.7 percent per year; between 1950 and 1970 of close to 2.6 percent 
per year; and for the full 45 year period from 1925 to 1970, 2.1 
percent per year--suggesting that the level in 1970 was over 2,5 
. ' .t imes. that inthe initia ' 1 year. 13 One may assume that other aspects 
of the social structure were also modernized in Latin America (e.g. 
higher literacy and level of education, improved health, greater 
levels of consumption), However, the fact that birth rates failed 
to decline means that modernization was partial, and may have failed 
to affect some other aspects of the social and economic structure. 
Finally, one should note that in two other less developed regions 
the rough indexes of aggregate product per capita rose substantially: 
from 1950 to 1970 in fast and Southeast Asia (excluding Japan) and 
from 1960 to 1970 in Africa (excluding South Africa). 14 
We come now to the question: why have the much higher birth 
rates in the LDCs persisted through decades of declining death rates 
and rising urbanization and per capita income? Only conjectures are 
possible. The summary findings above, relating to the demographic 
components of these high fertility levels are only suggestive of a 
deliberate process. And the extensive literature, bearing largely 
on fertility differentials and trends in the economically developed 
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countries, is also only suggestive, particularly with respect to the 
transition theory. The latter outlines a paradigm of a shift from the 
traditional or pre-industrial to the modern demographic patterns; and 
thus implicitly indicates the factors underlying the "traditionally" 
h . h f ·1· .ig erti ity rates in the current LDCs. lS But, as h as been in. d.icated , 
one must allow for the different fertility and mortality levels, and 
the different historical conditions of the current LDCs c0mpared with 
the vital rates and historical conditions of the presently developed 
countries in their pre-industrial periods in the eighteenth or nine­
teenth centuries. The literature on demographic experience of the 
LDCs is quite limited, if only because statistical data have become 
available only recently (and are still deficient) and the accumulation 
of analytical results has just begun. 16 Nor is it feasible here to 
comb the limited but still vast literature. The attemot is_ 
rather to present a few broad reflections, induced partly by the 
evidence summarized, partly by the readily available literature on 
demographic and economic patterns. These, we hope, will be of interest 
as at least indications of possible directions of further research. 
It might help to group the factors that could serve to explain 
the higher fertility rates in the LDCs under three broad heads: the 
technology of birth control; the possibly lower costs of larger numbers 
of children in the LDCs; the possibly higher returns from larger 
numbers of children in the LDCs. These three groups are not mutually 
exclusive, and each comprises a wide range of subvariables. But one 
can secure at least an impression of the relative magnitudes of their 
contributions to the demographic pattern to be explained, and a notion 
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of the identity of some of the subvariables. 
As the quotation in footnote 16 indicates, even in the LDCs 
fertility is controlled. In all of them some institutions and customs 
keep fertility below the biological potential. This is a matter of 
some importance, since it suggests that modernization may destroy or 
weaken these institutions and customs before the new restraining 
factors associated with modernization become fully operative. But 
the technoloey of birth control referred to above is clearly the 
modern technology, that is far more readily available in the economical­
ly developed countries. In the DCs generally the population is richer 
and more literate, the transport and communication systems are better, 
and government has a more permissive or favorable attitude. The implica­
tion is that the modern, effective, technology of birth control is not 
available to the population of the LDCs, because of high economic costs 
of delivery, or the indifferent or negative attitude of the government, 
or both; and that much of the high birth rate is due to unwanted births, 
unwanted by the parents who could have avoided them, given more 
effective control technology. 
There is little question that~ group in every large popula­
tion, whether in a 9-eveloped or less developed country, would have, 
with better application of better birth control technology, avoided some 
births that were unwanted. However, "unwanted" is a term subject to many 
ambiguities in application in quantitative research (unwanted as to timing, 
or forever, unwanted under what conditions, and the like). Nevertheless, 
more effective technology and at a lower costs would have, in any population, 
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~ net curbing effect on births--almost be definition of effectiveness 
and cost. But how significant is such a factor, in explaining the 
vast differentials in fertility between the LDCs and the DCs? 
Several weighty argunents can be adduced to suggest that it 
is of limited importance. To begin with, age at time of marriage, 
particularly of women, is clearly an important variable which can be 
modified, as it has been in the past history of several European and 
related societies, and thereby affect fertility significantly. 
This, however, is a change in human and institutional practices, and 
is little influenced by birth control technology more directly relevant 
to intra-marital fertility. Furthermore, intra-marital fertility has 
varied markedly among the current DCs in their pre-industrial phase, 
when birth control was far less advanced that it is today. These 
variations find some parallels today among the less developed countries. 
The two factors just mentioned yielded crude birth rates in the late 
eighteenth century that ranged from 31 per 1,000 in Norway and Denmark 
to 38 per 1,000 in. f' . h ' d States.
17inland, to 55 per 1,000 int e Unite 
If the spread of crude birth rates could be so wide with late 
eighteenth century birth control technology, one wonders why the 
current technology within the LDCs has been so inadequate. More 
important, one may ask why, if more children were seen to lead to 
economic misery, have the families in the LDCs not manifested a 
sufficiently strong demand for effective birth control means, a 
demand that would overcome the indifference of government and the 
obstacles connected with high costs. After all, other products 
81 
and aspects of modern technology--ranging from those that reduced death 
rates so rapidly to the minor palatable products like radio sets and 
Coca Cola--have spread widely and been accepted. If the argument is 
that established views and ideas, which persist despite changing events, 
did not encompass the need for modern birth control technology, then 
the identifiable factor is not the absence of such technology, but the 
lack of demand for it. Why, then, have the high fertility levels con­
tinued to be wanted--presumably by dominant proportions of the popula­
tion, if not by the small group who really desired fewer children but 
were inhibited by difficulties in securing effective tools? 
In turning now to costs of, and returns from, children, we note 
first that these costs and returns can be economic, social, or psychologi­
cal. Then we may also ask what units weigh these costs and returns-­
giving not only explicit, overt consideration to these minuses and pluses, 
but also intutitive responses that.nevertheless reflect real balances. 
Is it the parental pair, the larger family of which the pair is a member, 
the larger blood-related collective (tribe, caste, etc.), or even a 
still larger aggregate that sets the norms to which parental pair may 
refer? In the discussion here, we emphasize the economic and related 
social costs; and given the structure of LDCs, one must bear in mind 
the possible reference of decisions regarding the number of children 
to norms established by a much wider, if still blood-related, group 
than the nuclear, or even the extended family. 
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Under the largely rural, family business, conditions in the 
LDCs, direct and indirect costs of a child are far lower than for 
the competitive, nuclear family of an economically developed country. 
In the latter much reliance is placed on the individual earning (or 
social) power of the father, which would be adversely affected by 
the economic and other burdens of many children. In a developed 
economy also the high earning and other power of the wife and would-
be mother would be foregone, if her time and energy were absorbed in 
childbearing and child-rearing. Furthermore, in the developed societies 
a much greater investment must be made in the rearing of children, so 
that the direct inputs (as distinct from indirect costs) per child are 
much higher than in the LDCs. In the latter, only a small investment 
is needed to rear a child to maturity as an effective economic agent 
under the conditions of the country and the family. 
There is little question that the absolute costs of children, 
direct or indirect, are far lower in the LDCs than in the DCs. One 
related point may be added. Because of the closer ties of family in 
a less developed country to a larger, blood-related aggregate, any 
unusual costs of the specific family, particularly in connection with 
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children, may be covered, partly at least, by its associates within the 
tribe, caste, or similar type of group. 
Yet one must consider absolute costs in relation to the total 
income of the family unit involved. Are the direct ancl incHrPct 
costs ofa child in the family of a less developed country clearly loweJ.' 
relative to the total income of the family than the greater costs of a 
child in a family in developed country relative to its larger income? 
If the potential income of the latter is X dollars, and it is reduced 
to X-C by the direct and indirect costs of a prospective child, and 
if the potential income of the former is X/K dollars and it is reduced 
to (X/K) - (C/L), is L necessarily less than K (Kand L being larger 
than one)? Even if the proportional burden of the monetary magnitude 
of the costs of a child are the same in the LDCs and DCs, with the 
generally lower income in the former, the welfare burden would still 
be greater. 
But costs are not independent of returns. They would be in­
dependent only if we fixed the latter by assumption. And one may argue 
that returns are a major factor in any explanation of the persistence 
of high fertility rates in the LDCs. This judgment reflects the general 
notion that societies, and groups within them, are responsive to 
differential cost and return opportunities. Although a long persisting 
framework of such opportunities clothes the largely rational responses 
in social norms and ideological garments, once the framework of costs 
and returns has changed for families or for groups of families, the 
adjustment should be relatively rapid. If the response, in fact, 
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deviates significantly from the rational content, and if the lag, in 
fact, is long, one must attempt to establish, in a testable fashion, 
both the factors that underly the deviation and the mechanism that 
generates the lag. Broad references to peculiarities of human nature, 
or to the existence of a lag, are merely descriptions of the puzzle, 
. 18h h 1rat er tan exp anations. 
If then we consider the returns from children, the implication 
is that the families in the LDCs view children as a source of wealth, 
the latter defined broadly as economic or social power. Either in 
weighting costs against returns, or in adherence to social norms still 
justified in their eyes, the families invest in children because they 
view them as a source of economic or social gain. This view may be 
held also by the blood-related collectives larger than the family 
household or extended family, even reaching into the large politically 
sovereign aggregates. But in our discussion we shall be concerned 
primarily with the family. 
Three aspects of the investment in children may be distinguished. 
One is the economic, labor-pool aspect, the desire for more children 
because under the rural or small family business conditions of the LDCs 
they provide a supply of labor at the disposal of the family that, 
after some years, provides economic savings and advance far greater 
than any that could be generated by the same family unit with fewer 
offspring. A crude calculation, based on reasonably low mortality 
rates and economical ways of raising the younger generation, might show 
that the net contribution of an additional child starting work in his 
teens and continuing to the early or mid-twenties would be quite sub-
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stantial--if the child is male, and even if he leaves his family upon 
. 19
marriage. Nor should one overlook the possible contribution of an 
additional daughter, not only from work within the family, but also in 
many countries from the bride price or the benefit from the connections 
with.the husband's family. 
The second aspect of investment in children might be designated 
the genetic pool aspect. It is relevant to those less developed 
countries in which, because of the inequality within the economic and 
social structure, investment in greater personal equipment and further 
education of few children is no assurance of upward social mobility. 
In these societies mobility is blocked by monopolization of economic 
and social power by a limited number of families. Under such condi­
tions, advance for the offspring of the lowly is a matter of success 
based on personal characteristics and endowments, on a kind of genetic 
lottery that may turn up a dictatorial corporal or general, or a 
successful athlete (or their female consorts) so prevalent in many LDCs. 
A rational calculation would encourage a family in such circumstances 
to have as many children as can survive in passable health to maturity-­
on the chance that one may be so endowed genetically as to raise not 
only himself or herself, but also the family, above the low initial 
level. One should note that both the genetic pool and the labor pool 
aspects of returns from children apply also to the lower economic 
groups within the developed countries--particularly if these groups are 
socially discriminated against. 
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The third, and widest reaching aspect, of the investment in 
children is that of security. The latter involves not merely, and 
not foremost, economic security of parents who, in their old age, have 
to rely on,the help of children, reliance needed in absence of social 
. . f h . • Cprovisions or sue security in most LD s. 20 The scope of the 
sec.urity aspect is much broader, encompassing the protection against 
natural and social calamities, which is not provided by government 
or other organs of society (not blood-related)--and must be supplied 
by the family, or larger, blood-related collectives. The pressure 
toward large families has been associated with the weakness and un­
reliability of governmental structure in many pre-industrial societies, 
and the need to rely on the family in a weakly organized community 
that fails to provide adequate protection to the individual member as 
an individual. Even today, in many LDCs, the need to rely heavily 
on the family, the tribe, or some blood-tie subgroup different from 
the national community as a whole, is fairly apparent. So long as 
the conditions persist, an adequate increase in numbers of those related 
by protective blood-ties will be a goal, justified even despite possible 
h isa vantages.sort-term d . d 21 
To digress from discussion of the family, one should note tre 
decentralization of authority and the intensification of nationalist 
ties in the world in recent decades; and the prevalence within many 
national states, particularly LDCs, of regional and ethnic divergences, 
only exacerbated by uneven p~essures of modern economic growth. In 
these conditions, despite the Malthus argument that the quality of 
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population is important, the quantity of population has become charged 
with political significance, and has turned into a tool in international 
and intra-national contests and potential conflicts. The continuing 
controversy in Nigeria concerning reliability of the regional population 
totals in the several censuses is one illustration of the value ascribed 
to numbers. And the recent stand by Brazil (at the 1974 Bucharest World 
Population Conference) on its own population-growth aims is another il­
lustration that,"in the international power game, numbers are not a 
sign of weakness but of strength. This is not to deny the desire of 
Brazil to spread a larger population over its wide open spaces; but it 
does reflect a viewpoint, shared by the governments of many other LDCs, 
large and small, that see advantages in larger numbers. These advantages 
may be envisioned as wider domestic markets and a larger labor force for 
exploiting unutilized resources, or as a larger protective reserve in a 
world still beset by international tensions, armed conflicts, and possibly 
enormous dangers associated with some aspects of modern technology. In 
any case, the LDCs, in particular, tend to see in larger population a 
source strength that they may lack, relative to the DCs, in technology 
and material capital. 
In short, while there may be some validity to the statement that 
LDCs are poor because they are prolific, it may be said that they 
are prolific because they are poor. To put it more precisely, they 
are prolific because under their economic and social conditions large 
proportions of the population see their economic and social interests 
in more children as a supply of family labor, as a pool for a genetic 
lottery, and as a matter of e~onomic and social security in a weakly 
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organized, non-protecting, society. Furthermore, while the private 
interests of the parental generation may be in conflict with the long­
term economic interests of the national community, there is some 
agreement between the two when we relate families to larger blood-tie 
groups within the nation and consider the family and the nation in 
terms of external security interests in a divided and dangerously tense 
world. 
It is hardly necessary to emphasize the speculative character 
of the comments just made. Yet they are suggested by, and are consistent 
with, the implications of much of the statistical evidence summarized. 
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The conjectures would be more useful if some attention were given to 
components of change within countries. Thus, it may be that the declining 
death rates and rising income per capita had different impacts on dif­
ferent groups within the LDCs. It may be that the fertility for some 
modernizing groups declined, but that of other groups increased, with 
greater health and nutrition and relaxation of traditional restraints. 
In that case, the persistence of high aggregate fertility rates would 
be the result of a balance of conflicting trends within the population, 
promising a decline as the relative weights of the groups shift. But 
it was not feasible to pursue these hints here; and in any case, there 
would be serious data problems in the way. 
Nor is it feasible here to discuss the policy implications of 
the situation suggested by the double statement that LDCs are poor 
because they are prolific and prolific because they are poor--except 
to indicate that in many similar situations in the past innovative 
breakthroughs brought about changes in economic and social institutions 
89 
and led to the emergence and spread of groups pioneering in new and 
modern directions. 
Finally, one must stress that the above comments constitute 
judgments on the importance of various groups of factors that might 
explain the persisting high birth rates in the LDCs--for which I have 
no quantitative weights derived from tested evidence. They should, 
therefore, be viewed as tentative and rough, although plausiblY 




see Frank Lorimer and others, Culture and Human Fertility (Paris, 
UNESCO, 1954), pp. 52-53; quoted in United Nations, Population Bulletin, 
no. 7, 1963 (New York, 1965), p. 101. Section VII of this Bulletin, pp. 
10121, has extensive discussion of age patterns of fertility. 
Fecundity is the physiological capacity of woman for procreation, and 
is characterized by a rather narrowly defined span with greatly varying 
levels within the span. 
2High total fertility, even higher than that for the less developed 
countries today, was shown in the past in some of the currently more developed 
countries--but always with a low birth rate for the younger age class. Thus, 
in European Russia in 1897, total fertility was as high as 7,060, but the 
rate for the 15-19 class was only 30; similar rates for Bulgaria for 1901-05 
were 6,570 and 23; for Serbia and Croatia-Slavonia combined in 1910, 5,595 
and 44 (see Robert R. Kuczynski, The Balance of Births and Deaths, Vol. II, 
various tables, The Institute of Economics of the Brookings Institution, 
New York, 1931). In the successor states--USSR, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia-­
total fertility rates for the mid-1960s, according to United Nations sources, 
ranged from 2,075 for Bulgaria to 2,695 for Yugoslavia. 
If we group the 52 countries covered in lines 1-5 of Table 1, i.e., 
all the less developed, including Hong Kong and Singapore, in descending 
order.of the birth rate for the younger age group, 15-19, and strike group 
averages, the following associations are revealed: 
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Footnote 2 (continued): 
Averages of Age Specific Birth Rates, Countries Grouped in Declining Order 
of the Rate for the 15-19 Class 
Groups (Number 
of countries Changes Total 
in parentheses) 15-19 20-24 25-29 (1-2) (2-3) Fertility 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Top (6) 239 309 289 70 -20 6,665 
2. II (6) 173 305 285 132 -20 6,455 
3. III (7) 147 310 294 163 -16 6,155 
4. IV (7) 136 288 298 152 10 6,030 
5. V (7) 124 308 339 184 31 6,745 
6. VI (7) 105 299 322 194 23 6,435 
7. VII (6) 75 265 291 190 26 5,885 
8. VII (6) 45 244 299 191 55 5,250 
As the rate for the youngest class declines, the change in the rate 
from the 20-24 to the 25-29 class shifts from a minus to a plus, thus 
indicating the movement of the peak toward later ages. Even more inter­
esting is the fact that through the sixth of the eight groups, total 
fertility shows no decline. This is because the declire of more than 100 
points in the age specific rate for the 15-19 class is offset by the rise 
in the rates at the later ages. 
3
The underlying population data here are from the Demographic Yearbook, 
1965 (New York, 1966). The total for the LDCs is the weighted average for 
the four regions; and the rate for each region is the weighted average of the 
subregions (Other Asia, Middle South Asia, and South East Asia for ESE Asia; 
Southwest Asia and North Africa for the Middle East; the rest of Africa, 
except South Africa for the Sub-Saharan region; and Latin America, excluding 
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Footnote 3 (continued): 
the Temperate Zone, for Latin America). For the DCs I took Northern and 
Western Europe, and Italy to represent Europe; North America, Australia and 
New Zealand for the overseas offshoots; and Japan. The crude birth rates 
for 1960-64 are given in the sources for Table l; and we used the sum of 
populations in 1960 and 1964 as weights. 
·4see e.g. Table 21 of United Nations, Demographic Yearbook, 1969 
(New York, 1960), the latest volume emphasizing data on natality. The high 
proportions of illegitimate births shown for many Latin American countries 
(and some-in Asia) reflect the prevalence of consensual marriages. Since 
we include consensual with legal marriages, such births must be treated as 
legitimate. 
5See discussion of table on marital status (Table 7) in United Nations 
Demographic Yearbook, 1968 (New York 1969), pp. 21-22. 
6Some confirmation of the findings is suggested by the rather meager 
data on age distributions of brides and grooms in the LDCs (compared with 
the DCs). For five countries in the Middle East and six countries in Latin 
America we have the median ages of brides and grooms and those of married 
men and women (consensual marriages excluded)--both groups covered only 
through age classes 15-49. In the tabulation below we compare these with 
similar data for twelve countries in the DC group. 
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Footnote 6 (continued): 
Median Ages of Brides and Married Women, and of Bridegrooms 
and Married Men, LDCs and DCs, 1960s 
(for brides and wives below 50) 
Median Corres- Differ- Median Corres- Differ-
age, ponding age, ence age, ponding age, ence 
Bride groom (2-1) wife husband (5-4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1. Middle East, 
5 countries 20.3 26.3 6.0 31.l 39.2 8.1 
2. Latin America, 
6 countries 22.0 26.2 4.2 32.1 37.2 5.1 
3. ME and LA 21.2 26.2 5.1 31.6 38.2 6.6 
4. Developed 
Countries 22.7 25.4 2.7 35.3 38.2 2.9 
Notes: 
Underlying data are from United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1968· (New 
York, 1969), Table 27 (for age at marriage) and Table 7 (for distribution by 
age and marital status). 
In general, the year of marriage was assumed to lie between 3 and 5 years 
before the year for which marital status was reported. 
Countries covered in the Middle East are Iraq, Jordan, UAR, Tunisia, and 
Algeria; for Latin America--Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, Chile, and 
Venezuela. The consensual category was omitted and the two regions were weighted 
equally. 
The DCs covered are the eight largest countries in Europe, all overseas off­
shoots except New Zealand, and Japan. The weights for the three regions were 
those used in the text tables. In deriving the age partition values for men 
corresponding to the median age of bride (wife), we matched younge.r groups (husbands) 
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Footnote 6 (continued): 
with younger brides (wives). For medians this implies no internal matching 
within the age distribution, since the full-range of the younger groups 
(husbands) is assumed to correspond to the total 15-49 range of brides (wives). 
Both the excess of age of husband over wife and the excess of age of 
group over that of bride are wider in the LDCs than in the DCs. Moreover, 
the spread is somewhat wider for ages of wives and husbands than for ages 
of brides and grooms in the LDCs (from 5.1 to 6.6 years), not true of DCs (where 
it changes from 2.7 to 2.9 years). The wife-husband population is, of course, 
older than the bride-groom--and the widening of the excess of ages of husband 
over wife, compared with groom over bride, suggests the tendency observed in Table 
5, for the excess of the age of husband over wife to rise as the wife grows 
older--particularly notable in the LDCs, but rather minor in the DCs. 
Needless to say, because countries in ESE Asia (particularly India, Pakistan, 
and Indonesia) and in Sub-Saharan Africa are omitted, the median age for the 
bride among the LDCs in the tabulation just shown is too high. Hence, the 
difference between the LDCs and the DCs in the median age of brides in lines 
3 and 4, col. 2 is underestimated. 
7 see 0. Andrew Collver, Birth Rates in Latin America: New Estimates 
of Historical Trends and Fluctuations. Research Series no. 7, Institute of 
Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1965. The estimates are taken 
from Tables 11, 16, 19, 22, 28, 31, 34, 37, 40, 44, 47, and 50, pp. 66, 81, 
89, 99, 116, 121, 127, 135, 144, 154, 160, and 169. 
8The quotation is from p. 6 of the United Nations manual on Methods of 
Projecting Households and Families, referred to as the main source for Table 
10 below. A useful, if summary, discussion of the concepts of family and 
hold is found on pp. 5-12. 
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9The data are from the United Nations working paper, Population 
Estimates by Regions and Countries, 1950-1960, ESA/P/WP. 31, May 1970. 
lOF ll . . see my paper, "Income-
Related Differences in National Increase: Bearing on Growth and Distribution 
of Income," in Paul A. David and Melvin W. Reder, eds., Nations and Households 
in Economic Growth, Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, New York, 1974, Tables 
1 and 2, pp. 130 and 133. Evidence for Taiwan and the Philippines indicates 
that.this negative association between size of household and income per person 
is found also in the LDCs. 
or i
O 
ustrative data for the United States 
11s ee Un"ited Nations,. Growth of t he World' s Uranb and Rura1 Popu1at"ion, 
1920-2000 (New York, 1969), Table 47, p. 115, and Table 48, p. 116. 
12
see the United Nations background paper prepared for the 1974 
World Population Conference, cited for Table 11, lines 3 and 6, Table 14, 
p. 30. 
13
The estimates for 1925-1950 are from Alexander Ganz, "Problems and 
Uses of National Wealth Estimates in Latin America," in Raymond Goldsmith and 
Christopher Saunders, eds., Income and Wealth Series No. VIII (Bowes and Bowes, 
London, 1969), Table III, p. 226. The estimates for 1950-60 and 1960-70 are 
from Table 6B of United Nations, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1969: 
vol. II, International Tables (New York, 1970), and Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1972, vol. III, International Tables, (New York, 1974). 
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14The source for 1950-60 is the United Nations Yearbook, 1969 and for 
1960-70, the Yearbook, 1972, both cited in footnote 13. For East and Southeast 
Asia the annual growth rate for 1950-70 in gross domestic product per capita 
was somewhat over 2 percent, yielding a cumulative rise of 50 percent over the 
two decades; that for Africa for 1960-70 was only slightly lower. It must be 
noted, however, that these are aggregates, and make no allowance for divergences 
among countries or for income ineoualities within countries. 
15For an illuminating sunnnary of the transition theory and the modifi­
cations in it in the light of current research see A. J. Coale, "The Demographic 
Transition Reconsidered," a paper presented at the Liege 1973 International 
Population Conference of the International Union for Scientific Study of Popula­
tion, pp. 53-72. 
16rn the 1953 United Nations volume, The Determinants and Consequences 
of Population Trends (New York, 1953), which was a valuable compilation of 
findings of studies on the relations between population changes and economic 
and social conditions, the sunnnary of Chapter V noted that statistical data 
on fertility are lacking, particularly for "most under-developed countries" 
(p. 96. par. 141) and in referring to factors that account for high fertility 
("in the neighborhood of 40 per thousand" p.97, par. 145) notes "factors such 
as the nearly universal marriage of women at young ages and the absence of the 
use of birth control measures." But the sunnnary also notes that even these 
LDCs have "institutions and customs which reduce fertility substantially below 
the biological potential." 
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Footnote 16 (continued) 
The revised edition of the volume, United Nations, The Determinants and 
Consequences of Population Trends: New Summary of Findings on Interaction of 
Demographic, Economic and Social Factors, Vol. I (New York, 1973), contains 
in Chapter IV a much richer discussion of fertility levels and trends in the 
high fertility (i. ~ LDC) countries; and a wider exploration of the cultural, 
economic and social factors behind them. But the discussion connnents on the 
difficulties of applying the past experience of the presently developed countries 
to the current LDCs (see paragraph 134, p. 96); and, in trying to explain why 
there has been little response of the birth rates in the LDCs to much higher 
levels of income and lower levels of death rates, still emphasi.zes the "thres­
hold" hypothesis. The latter assumes that the modernization and economic growth 
levels must reach some relatively high level before effects on birth rates may 
be expected. But as I suggested in another connection, the hypothesis is but 
another name for the puzzle--rather than a substantive explanation, that would 
spec:f_-Fv thP. factors that prevent sizable rises in income and decl.inPr-:: "'" rl<:>::itb .,.ates 
from having an effect (see the connnents in my paper, "Economic Aspects of 
Fertility Trends in the Less-Developed Countries," ins. J. Behrman, Leslie 
Corsa Jr. and Ronald Freedman, eds., Fertility and Family Planning: A World 
View (Ann Arbor, 1969), pp. 157-159). 
17For a convenient· summary o ' imon tf t hese vital rates see s· Kuzne s, 




This applies also to the "threshold" hypothesis referred to in 
footnote 16, and criticized in my earlier paper cited in that footnote. 
In that paper, I argued that in explaining the high birth rates in 
the LDCs a rather limited weight should be assigned to the "purely econoic 
social institutions and life patterns" (p. 101). The seeming inconsistency 
between the position taken then and the discussion here is due largely to 
the narrow definition of the term "economic variables" in the earlier paper. 
19 see the discussion in Mahmood Mamdani, The Myth of Population Control: 
Family, Caste, and Class in an Indian Village, Monthly Review Press, New York, 
1972. This short book is based largely on interviews with members of dif­
ferent castes in a Punjab village that was the focus of an earlier long-term 
study and prolonged field effort at education in family planning and birth 
control. One cannot judge the validity of the results even in terms of the 
given village, let alone their relevance to a wider field of population 
experience and motivation among the LDCs. But the book is useful in quoting 
the reasons adduced by various occupational groups for having more children, 
particularly sons. 
20 see the analysis in papers by David M. Heer and Dean 0. Smith 
which uses simulation techniques to derive the number of births required if, 
given the mortality levels prevailing in the LDCs, a parental couple wishes 
to assure a high probability that at least one son will survive to father's 
old age. The papers are "Mortality Level, Desired Family Size., and Population 
Increase," Demography.,vol. 5, no. 1, 1968, pp. 104-121, and "Mortality Level, 
Desired Family Size and Population Increase: Further Variations on a Basic 
Model," Demography, vol. 6, no. 2, May 1969, pp. 141-150. 
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21Th. 1 · . . . f al 1 . .is argument app ies, in particular, in cases o natur ca amities 
and breakdowns of civil authority in internal conflicts. The vulnerability 
of LDCs to such disasters, combined with the weakness of central authority, 
is obvious. While natural and social calamities may raise the death rate 
temporarily.the sustaining long-term effects making for higher birth rates 
probably more than compensate in the aftermath. 
For a suggestive analysis of the key role of the family as a major 
resource in a recent calamity see Robert W. Kates and others, "The Human 
Impact of the Managua Earthquake," Science, vol. 182, December 7, 1973 
pp. 981-990. 
22Many of h ' ' ' h those use . .t e arguments are identical wit d int. he transition 
theory to explain "traditional" high birth rates (see the long summary quota­
tion from Notestein in the Coale paper cited, in footnote 15. 
